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Abstract
Research on family firm performance has led to inconclusive results which is why scholars called for a differentiated consider-
ation of family firms during exogenous shocks, where costs and benefits of the inherent ownership structure are assumed to be
magnified. Following these calls, I use the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009 as a unique natural experiment where firms
have been moved out of their equilibrium while ownership structure maintained constant in the near term. I differentiate
between true family firms and lone founder firms and hypothesize that the firm performance of both ownership structures
during the Global Financial Crisis is higher than for non-family firms. In a study of 178 firms listed in the German Prime
Standard, I found that lone founder ownership was significantly associated with higher firm performance during the GFC,
while showing no differences in performance during the period of stable economic conditions prior to the crisis. For true fam-
ily ownership, in contrast, the results suggest a general tendency of superior performance during the steady-state pre-crisis
period, but it could not be established that these firms outperformed other firms during the GFC. Analogously, I found that
the presence of a family CEO in true family firms is beneficial for firm performance during stable economic conditions, but the
advantageousness seems to vanish in times of severe financial distress.
Keywords: Family firm; ownership; governance; performance; crisis.
1. Introduction
Family firms represent the most dominant economic force
worldwide, accounting for approximately 90% of all compa-
nies in the world (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Family ownership is predominant
in countries located in Continental Europe, Middle East, or
Asia (Minichilli, Brogi, & Calabrò, 2016), but also plays a piv-
otal role in the United States, where family firms constitute
70 percent of all publicly listed firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003)
and one third of the companies listed in the S&P 500 (Ander-
son & Reeb, 2003). This dominance might explain why schol-
ars have devoted much attention to understanding the char-
acteristics as well as consequential benefits and costs of fam-
ily ownership in the last two decades (e.g. Anderson, Duru,
& Reeb, 2009; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacob-
son, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Maseda, Iturralde, Aparicio,
Boulkeroua, & Cooper, 2019; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Within academic literature on family firms, a growing body
of research has focused on the impact of family ownership on
firm performance. However, findings on corporate perfor-
mance of family firms so far have been inconclusive: On the
on hand, researchers argued that family ownership is harm-
ful for firm performance as the families might pursue private
benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003), the availability of financial and so-
cial resources may be restricted (Poletti-Hughes & Williams,
2019), and conflicts between economic and non-economic
goals of the family might arise (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
On the other hand, firm performance might be enhanced due
to reduced conflicts between ownership and management
(Andres, 2008), the commitment to lead the firm as stewards
in a collectivistic way (Chu, 2011), unique strategic resources
(Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008), and the
benefit from long-term orientation (Gentry, Dibrell, & Kim,
2016) as well as unique values and norms of the family (An-
dres, 2008). In order to better disentangle the impact of own-
ership on firm performance, various researchers argued that
the consideration of overall economic activity, specifically
an economic downturn, will enrich corporate governance
research and provide further insights into the ownership-
performance relationship (e.g. Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013;
Minichilli et al., 2016; Saleh, Halili, Zeitun, & Salim, 2017;
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Zhou, Wang, & He, 2012). Specifically, they argued that, dur-
ing an economic crisis, firms are moved out of their equilib-
rium while ownership structure maintains constant at least in
the short-term. Thereby, an exogenous shock such as an eco-
nomic crisis serves as a natural experiment where costs and
benefits of the ownership structure are magnified. Therefore,
this differentiated perspective might provide new insights,
contributing to the long-lasting discussion as to whether cer-
tain ownership structures have an enhancing impact on firm
performance.
In a study of 178 firms listed in the German Prime Stan-
dard, I analyzed how ownership structures affected firm per-
formance during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007- 2009.
I substantiate my hypotheses with prior academic research
and argumentation referring to the agency theory, steward-
ship theory, resource based view, as well as the concept of
socio-emotional wealth. Furthermore, I contribute to the de-
bate of heterogeneity that has gained increasing attention in
recent family firm literature (e.g. Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda,
2010; Block, Jaskiewicz, & Miller, 2011; Maseda et al., 2019)
by incorporating a differentiated perspective on how large
the stake held by the family is, how actively the family is
involved in the management of the firm, and whether the
firm is owned and managed by a lone founder rather than
by descendants or multiple family members of the founder.
The results indicate that lone founder firms, where the firms’
founders are large shareholders of the firm, do not exhibit
superior effects during the steady-state pre-crisis period but
seem to outperform during crisis, in times where the firms
faced serious threats due to macroeconomic developments.
In contrast, true family firms, where multiple members of the
same family are large shareholders of the firm, show a supe-
rior performance during overall stable economic conditions
but do not exhibit significant performance differences during
the global economic crisis. Furthermore, while the presence
of a family CEO in true family firms is observed to be ben-
eficiary during stable economic conditions, the competitive
advantage of a family CEO seemed to vanish during the GFC.
This thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide
a theoretical background of extant literature on firm perfor-
mance of family firms and develop my hypotheses. There-
after, section 3 describes the sample and how the data has
been retrieved, explains the independent, dependent, and
control variables, and finally describes the statistical model
used to test the hypotheses. In section 4, the results of the
statistical regression are outlined. Moreover, robustness tests
and further empirical analyses are presented in this section.
The findings are discussed in detail in section 5. In this sec-
tion, I also outline implications for theory and practice as
well as limitations and fruitful avenues for future research.
In section 6, the thesis will be concluded.
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
This section provides an overview of prior academic re-
search on the performance of family firms in general and dur-
ing difficult times such as the Global Financial Crisis. There-
after, three hypotheses will be derived by suggesting how
specific ownership structures influence firm performance. In
order to disentangle the complex of multiple studies and ob-
servations proposing different, even contrasting results, het-
erogeneity regarding ownership, management involvement,
as well as generational stage will be taken into account. This
section proceeds as follows: First, an overview of existing
academic research studying the effect of family firm owner-
ship on firm performance will be outlined and the underly-
ing argumentation referring to different academic theories
and concepts will be analyzed. Furthermore, heterogeneity
among family firms and its effect on firm performance will
be introduced in this chapter. Second, the Global Financial
Crisis will be introduced and hypotheses on how family firms
have performed during such an economic downturn will be
developed.
2.1. Family Ownership and Firm Performance
The impact of family firm ownership has been studied ex-
tensively in numerous studies (Astrachan & Zellweger, 2008)
. However, despite the multitude of academic research dur-
ing the last three decades, it has remained a controversial
topic as results from studies all over the world produced dif-
ferent and even contrasting results with regard to the ques-
tion as to whether family firms show superior performance
than other types of firms (Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga, 2007).
Referring to widely accepted academic theories and concepts
such as Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, the Resource Based
View (RBV), or the concept of Socio-emotional Wealth (SEW),
this section seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of
extant literature and a profound understanding of the mech-
anisms underlying the ownership-performance relationship.
2.1.1. Family Ownership and Negative Firm Performance
Several studies have provided evidence suggesting that
family ownership affects firm performance negatively. Morck,
Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) analyzed the financial perfor-
mance of large Canadian family firms over a period of five
years between 1984 and 1989 and found that family owner-
ship is associated with poor financial performance when com-
pared to widely held firms. Achmad, Rusmin, Neilson, and
Tower (2009) also found that family firms show significantly
lower performance than non-family firms by examining large
listed Indonesian firms. Also Hamadi (2010) found that the
presence of a first largest shareholder, specifically when it
is a family organized as a voting block, has a significant
negative effect on firm performance. In his study, Hamadi
(2010) analyzed data of 147 Belgian listed firms covering a
five-year-period between 1991 and 1996. In the remainder
of this section, I will outline the underlying argumentation of
why family ownership might affect firm performance nega-
tively. Specifically, I will outline arguments related to agency
theory, RBV, as well as the concept of SEW.
In publicly listed firms, ownership and control are usually
separated, giving rise to conflicts between owners and man-
agers running the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen
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& Meckling, 1976). This situation, where dispersed share-
holders (principals) have to delegate control over a company
to managers (agents) is also called type 1 principal-agent
problem. This problem might be mitigated by concentrated
ownership where the firm is managed and owned by the
same shareholders and thus interests between principals
and agents are aligned (Maseda et al., 2019). However,
the presence of a large, block-holding family might give rise
to a different conflict providing a possible explanation for
the weaker performance of family firms: According to the
agency theory influenced by Fama and Jensen (1983), a con-
centration of ownership might result in conflicts between
the majority shareholders and minority shareholders, con-
stituting the so called type 2 principal-principal problem.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), this type of agency
conflict in some countries is more pronounced compared to
the type 1 principal-agent problem. The next two paragraphs
therefore outline in more depth how family owners might
try to maximize their personal utility at the expense of firm
performance, resulting in a disadvantageous shareholder
structure compared to widely held firms with a dispersed
ownership structure (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
First, scholars argued that the combination of ownership
and control allows family firms that hold a large stake in the
company to exchange firm profits for private benefits (Ander-
son & Reeb, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and thereby ex-
propriate minority investors (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001).
For example, family owners might draw scarce resources
away from firms’ profitable projects in order to consume
such resources privately (Demsetz, 1983). An expropriation
of firm wealth might occur by families paying out excessive
compensation, special dividends, or by related party transac-
tions that turn out to be unfavorable not only for the firm but
especially for other shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003)
and sometimes even for employees and creditors (Johnson,
LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000).
Second, rather than pursuing the enhancement of share-
holder value, family shareholders might strive for other
achievements such as technological innovation or growth
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Pursuing their own goals, family
owners might also take sub-optimal investment decisions
which are not in the best interest of other shareholders
(Andres, 2008). Thereby, corporate performance of pub-
licly listed firms, that is often measured as investors’ return,
might result to be lower.
Apart from arguments related to the agency theory, schol-
ars refer to the RBV when trying to understand why family
firms might show a weaker performance than their non-
family counterparts. According to Barney (1991), every
individual firm possesses heterogeneous resources and there-
fore can pursue different strategies to capitalize on its unique
resources and build a sustained competitive advantage over
other firms that have a different resource mix. Barney (2001)
defines resources of a firm as “all assets, capabilities, organi-
zational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge,
etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive
of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and
effectiveness” (p.101). As advantageous as these resources
can be, it also means that firms that do not have access
to resources to the same extent as their competitors might
have a strategic disadvantage and therefore under perform
when compared to their peers. The next two paragraphs will
outline how family firms suffer from a scarcity of specific
resources whereas non-family firms might not face such con-
straints.
First, with regard to financial capital, family firms suffer
from limited access to financing which might result in infe-
rior performance. On the one hand, equity financing might
entail a dilution of control which the family, that might be
emotionally tied to the firm, wants to avoid (Amihud, Lev,
& Travlos, 1990; Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Ward, 2004). On
the other hand, also debt financing is unattractive for family
firms as they wish to preserve a balance sheet with a healthy
leverage ratio and want to assure the firm’s survival in the
long-term (Dreux, 1990). High debt would increase the
firm’s vulnerability or bankruptcy risk which family owners
again want to avoid as families often have the majority of
their wealth invested in the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003)
and therefore seek to minimize the business risk of their
family firm (La Porta et al., 1999). Furthermore, higher vul-
nerability risk due to a high share of debt capital is avoided
by family firms as often the firm employs other family mem-
bers (Poletti-Hughes & Williams, 2019), the family well being
of future generations might be at stake (Schulze, Lubatkin,
& Dino, 2002), and the reputation following excessive bor-
rowing might be compromised (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski,
2006).
Second, with regard to social capital, Anderson and Reeb
(2003) argued that families often select top management
positions exclusively from their relatives and therefore limit
the pool of capable and qualified talent to a small number
of people. This restriction of talent might then potentially
lead to a competitive disadvantage and therefore inferior
performance when compared to other firms. The reasoning
behind that resource restricting action is that families want
to provide employment opportunities for family members
that might not find a similarly prestigious position (Poletti-
Hughes & Williams, 2019) and because of the emotional
pleasure families or founders experience when seeing their
offspring managing the firm they established (Andres, 2008).
The impact of family involvement in management on perfor-
mance will be further examined in section 2.1.3 Family Firm
Heterogeneity and Firm Performance.
A third concept that helps to better understand why family
firms under perform compared to their non-family counter-
parts is the concept of SEW. According to the concept of SEW,
the family is emotionally connected with the firm and actively
seeks to maintain control and ownership driven by economic
but also non-economic criteria such as the preservation of
family identity and authority or the provision of employ-
ment opportunities for family members (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007). This emotional attachment to the firm might result
in a deterioration of firm performance, as it will be outlined
in the following paragraph.
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In general, Chu (2009) argued that in family firms there
exist two distinct institutions that might not be compatible
in every aspect and therefore restrain efficient operations in
the firm: On the one hand, what today would be referred to
as dimensions of SEW, the family institution reflects social
ties, personal trust and assurance of care and nurturance
of all the members belonging to the family. On the other
hand, the business institution aims at economic rational-
ity, effectiveness and efficiency. According to Chu (2009),
the underlying set of values and norms of the two insti-
tutions are fundamentally different which is why financial
performance, the single most important goal of the business
institution, is lower compared to non-family firms where the
family institution does not exist. For example, Allouche et
al. (2008) argued that altruism among members of a family
might potentially lead to lower firm performance and harm
shareholder value. The family owning the firm refuses to
dismiss managers who are family members but not capable
of running the firm (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutier-
rez, 2001). This behavior might, for the moment, maintain
peace within the family but will harm firm performance and
ultimately shareholder value in the long term. A very fa-
mous illustration of SEW is the example of Spanish oil mills
introduced by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007). A few decades
ago, these oil mills were primarily owned by entrepreneurial
families. Gradually, the mills were offered membership of a
cooperative. This membership would have mitigated finan-
cial risk and volatility, but it also would have resulted in a
loss of family control and thus in a loss of SEW. Many Family
businesses decided against joining the cooperative, attaching
greater importance to independence and in return accepting
financial performance hazards.
To summarize, the negative performance of family firms
documented by several scholars could be explained by the
private benefits of control (agency theory), the limited avail-
ability of financial and social resources (RBV), and the con-
flict of economic and non-economic goals between the family
institution and the business institution (concept of SEW).
2.1.2. Family Ownership and Positive Firm Performance
Contrasting to the studies reviewed above, there exists a
multitude of academic research suggesting that family own-
ership is positively associated with firm performance. One of
the most cited articles analyzing family firm performance is
the study by Anderson and Reeb (2003). Analyzing 403 pub-
licly listed firms in the S&P 500, Anderson and Reeb (2003)
concluded that, overall, family firms performed better than
firms with different ownership structures. Similar results
have been found by other scholars examining family firm
performance in the United States (e.g. Anderson et al., 2009;
Block et al., 2011; Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang,
2007). Furthermore, researchers found evidence of the supe-
rior performance of family firms all over the world: Allouche
et al. (2008) found that Japanese listed family firms outper-
form their non-family counterparts. Andres (2008) provided
evidence suggesting that German family firms not only are
superior performer compared to widely held firms but also
compared to all other types of firms with a large blockholder.
Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, and Labelle (2013) found a sig-
nificant positive impact of family ownership on performance
when studying family and non-family firms in Canada. Other
scholars found a positive association between family firms
and performance in Sweden (Bjuggren & Palmberg, 2010),
Chile (Bonilla, Sepulveda, & Carvajal, 2010; Martínez et al.,
2007), Taiwan (Chu, 2009, 2011), China (Ding & Zhang,
2008), or Spain (Maseda et al., 2019) Again, the underlying
arguments that possibly explain these results will be outlined
in the following, referring to agency theory, stewardship the-
ory, RBV, as well as the concept of SEW.
The agency theory has been introduced earlier already.
Whereas family firms might be prone to principal-principal
conflicts, scholars argued that the combination of ownership
and management, as it is often the case for family businesses,
might be beneficial for firm performance (e.g. Anderson
& Reeb, 2003). In 2013, van Essen, van Oosterhout, and
Heugens stated that family blockholding can be seen as a
remedy to agency problems. The following paragraphs will
substantiate this argument in more detail and with the help
of some specific examples.
First, when ownership and management are concentrated,
owner-manager conflicts most likely fail to arise and there-
fore managerial entrenchment and expropriation can be
avoided (Andres, 2008; Chu, 2009): In a situation where
ownership and management are separated, managers could
act in their own interest instead of the shareholders’ interest.
Managers could invest a company’s resources in projects that
are valuable for themselves even though there might be bet-
ter investment alternatives that would maximize shareholder
value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). For example, managers
might engage in acquisitions that are harmful to shareholder
value but potentially lead to an increase of the manager’s
salary due to the increase in the size of the firm (Gorton,
Kahl, & Rosen, 2005). In family firms, where ownership
and management often are combined, the monitoring of
managers counteracts such opportunistic behavior (Van Es-
sen, van Oosterhout, & Heugens, 2013). Chu (2009) argued
that, since the objectives of owners and managers are aligned
and the owning family not only controls the firm but is also
the residual claimant of profits to be distributed, family firms
might be an ideal form of organization.
Second, concentrated ownership reduces transaction costs
and even creates economies of scale. For example, family
ownership might be beneficial as large blockholders can de-
velop specific capabilities to monitor a firm which other, more
dispersed blockholders cannot (Ryan & Schneider, 2002).
This is one of several examples showing that the presence
of family blockholders can successfully reduce transaction
costs (Black, 1990). Chu (2009), for instance, stated that
one specific requirement of control is information and in-
formation does come at a price. In family firms, he argued,
family shareholders have access to superior information and
better knowledge of the business which facilitates control
and reduces transaction costs. One example of such superior
information is the general notion that family members get in
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contact with and learn about the business from early child-
hood on (Kets de Vries, M., 1993).
It should be noted that, although the agency theory is
widely accepted, well researched, and often referred to
in academic family business literature, it is not completely
undisputed. Chu (2011) argued that stewardship theory has
been gaining more and more attention among family firm
research more recently and is offering a different perspective
on situational behavior that might even be contrary to agency
theory. According to the stewardship theory, managers do
not intrinsically follow their own interest at the expense of
shareholders but place a higher value on responsible man-
agement of the firm (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).
According to Chu (2011), family firm managers then act as
stewards, rather than agents of the firm and maximize their
utility by collectivistic, pro-organizational behavior instead
of self-serving, opportunistic behavior. He argued that a
reasoning related to the agency theory and hence the expla-
nation of performance differences therefore should be read
with caution and that a potential superiority of family firms
might rather originate from the commitment of stewards to
manage the family firm than from redundant monitoring and
governance mechanisms.
Scholars also substantiated the better performance of fam-
ily firms referring to the RBV. Regarding social capital, re-
searchers argued that family owners have experience and
specific knowledge that is more likely to be passed on within
generations of the family and therefore have a competitive
advantage compared to firms with other shareholder struc-
tures (Andres, 2008). Allouche et al. (2008) argued that
there is a special, intricate connection between the family
and the business which induces organizational efficiency:
Strategic resources are generated by the network of interac-
tions between the productive activities of the business and
the family. These strategic resources themselves can consti-
tute a source of competitive advantage (Arrègle, Durand, &
Véry, 2004). Specifically, the presence of family sharehold-
ers in the firm might be an intangible resource that enables
the company to build long-term relations with various types
of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers, or
banks (Chu, 2009).
With regard to technological resources, Zahra (2005)
found that family-owned firms are widely recognized as a
major source of entrepreneurial activities and technological
innovation, showing a better ability to combine intangible
and tangible resources to ensure innovativeness. It, there-
fore, is not only the availability of strategic resources but
also the right use and ability to transform them into output.
? found that family firms transform innovation input into
innovation output with a higher conversion rate than other
firms and, ultimately, show a higher innovation output com-
pared to their non-family counterparts.
With regard to financial resources, it has been argued ear-
lier in this paper that the limited access to capital through
debt financing is a disadvantage and therefore affects per-
formance negatively. Other scholars, however, argued dif-
ferently: Allouche et al. (2008) concluded that the limited
access to debt capital is positively associated with firm perfor-
mance as financial risk and therefore the risk to lose control
and face bankruptcy is reduced. Furthermore, Anderson,
Mansi, and Reeb (2002) argued, contrary to the belief of
restricted access to debt capital, that family firms have even
facilitated access to debt financing as they enjoy a lower
cost of debt. According to their study, family ownership
constitutes an organizational structure that better protects
the interests of creditors and bondholders. Therefore, fam-
ily firms tend to have an ownership-specific advantage over
other firms that might be manifested in superior firm perfor-
mance.
Scholars also refer to the concept of SEW when trying to
understand the positive impact of family ownership on firm
performance. First, family firms are often characterized as
having a long-term orientation and transgenerational inten-
tion where the business is seen as an asset that is going to be
passed on to later generations and therefore the family in-
heritance is preserved (e.g. Allouche et al., 2008; Chu, 2009;
Gentry et al., 2016). One potential effect of long-term orien-
tation is the implementation of optimal investment policies
in the long run (Stein, 1989). Firms with a longer investment
horizon experience less managerial opportunism and do suf-
fer less from short term pressures to boost current earnings
(Stein, 1989). The efficient investment decisions of family
firms are therefore assumed to be value enhancing (Andres,
2008). Furthermore, Allouche et al. (2008) argued that the
long-term orientation of family firms induces families to at-
tach greater importance to quality. Moreover, the long-term
nature of family firms allows them to develop long-lasting
ties and networks with other stakeholders (Anderson & Reeb,
2003).
Second, family shareholders share a certain set of values
with the business institution which in return might enhance
firm performance (Andres, 2008). With their set of values
and norms, families create a social construction of trust,
loyalty and altruism (Allouche et al., 2008). As a result,
the family firm creates a favorable working environment
resulting in lower employee turnover and might therefore
enhance firm performance (Andres, 2008). Furthermore,
the trust and loyalty is not only limited to the firm itself but
also enriches relationships to other stakeholders, thereby the
family realizes possible gains as they credibly commit to im-
plicit contracts and agreements (Andres, 2008). Moreover,
the desire to preserve the norms and values of the family
institution and the business institution is accompanied by
a reputational concern. Anderson and Reeb (2003) argued
that the family’s reputation is able to create long-term eco-
nomic consequences for the company whereas firms with
other shareholder structures might attach greater impor-
tance to the short-term performance.
To summarize, the positive performance of family firms
documented by several scholars could be explained by
reduced conflicts between ownership and management
(agency theory), the commitment to lead the firm in a col-
lectivistic way (stewardship theory), unique strategic re-
sources (RBV), and the benefit from long-term orientation
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and unique values and norms of the family (concept of SEW).
To complete the literature analysis on the association be-
tween family ownership and firm performance, two impor-
tant points need to be made. First, it should be noted that
a number of scholars could not identify performance differ-
ences between family firms and firms with other shareholder
types: Analyzing non-financial Spanish listed companies
during the period from 2003 to 2008,Sacristan-Navarro,
Gomez-Anson, and Cabeza-Garcia (2011a) could not find
any evidence that any type of ownership consistently and
significantly impacts firm performance either positively or
negatively. Other researchers came to similar conclusions
analyzing data of family firms in Italy (Sciascia & Mazzola,
2008), India (Singal & Singal, 2011), and France (Sirmon,
Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008).
Second, the debate of heterogeneity within family firms
has gained increasing attention in recent academic literature
(e.g. Arosa et al., 2010; Block et al., 2011; Maseda et al.,
2019; Perrini & Rossi, 2008; Zhou et al., 2012). Researchers
have documented several dimensions of family firm hetero-
geneity that should be considered when examining family
businesses qualitatively or quantitatively. Therefore, in the
following, an entire section of this thesis will be devoted to
this topic.
2.1.3. Family Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Performance
This section helps to better understand the underlying
mechanisms of family firms by disentangling family firm sta-
tus further. In the following, three aspects of heterogeneity
are outlined in more detail. First, considering the magnitude
of equity ownership helps to differentiate between low stakes
of family ownership and situations where families own large
shares of a firm. Second, family involvement in the man-
agement of the firm will be considered by analyzing how
performance is affected when one or more family members
are present on the management board. Finally, considering
the generational stage, lone founder firms are differentiated
from true family firms, where either several members of the
family are active as shareholders or in the management of
the firm or where one or more descendants of the founder
own or manage the firm.
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Lester (2010) argued that
ownership is a matter of degree and families that hold a large
number of shares thus might behave differently than families
possessing only a few voting rights. Reviewing extant liter-
ature, it turned out that some researchers found evidence
suggesting that the relationship between family ownership
and performance is indeed dependent on the magnitude of
ownership: Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that first, with
increasing family ownership, performance of S&P 500 firms
increases but at around 31% family ownership, the inflec-
tion point of maximum performance, performance starts to
decrease with increasing family ownership. They therefore
suggested a non-linear relationship between performance
and family ownership. If plotted in a graph, with firm per-
formance on the y-axis and family ownership on the x-axis,
the relationship would look like an inverted U shape. An-
alyzing a panel of 217 Polish companies, also Kowalewski,
Talavera, and Stetsyuk (2010) found an inverted U-shaped
relationship between family ownership and performance.
Furthermore, in a meta-analysis based on a total sample of
748,569 firm year observations that have been derived from
162 studies covering 23 European countries, Van Essen et al.
(2013) provided evidence suggesting that the relationship
between ownership and firm performance has a form of an
inverted U-shape. Moreover, De Massis, Kotlar, Campopiano,
and Cassia (2013) again found that the impact of family
ownership on firm performance is dependent on the mag-
nitude of ownership and suggested a U-shaped relationship
between family ownership dispersion and firm performance.
Those researchers suggesting a non-linear, U-shaped rela-
tionship between family ownership and firm performance,
substantiated their findings with arguments from the agency
theory that have been already introduced. Specifically, at
a lower level of ownership, a positive alignment between
the interests of shareholders and managers (reduced Type
1 principal-agent conflict) results in enhanced firm perfor-
mance. With an increasing stake of ownership, however,
minority shareholder expropriation through private benefits
of control (Type 2 principal-principal conflict) might lead to
a deterioration of firm performance again (e.g. Maseda et
al., 2019; Van Essen et al., 2013). In short, the non-linear
relationship between family ownership and performance is
explained by the existence of two competing arguments from
the agency theory that affect performance in its strongest
form at different levels of family ownership.
Besides family ownership, great importance has been at-
tached in recent academic research to the involvement of the
family in the management of the firm. The presence of family
CEOs and family members in the board of management is a
widely recognized family firm characteristic (e.g. Anderson
& Reeb, 2003) and implies active family management (Denis
& Denis, 1994). By being a CEO or holding another top man-
agement position, a family member can impact the strategic
direction of a firm (Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008). Espe-
cially the position of a family CEO is worth analyzing in more
detail as the CEO of the firm is generally considered the most
powerful and important actor of the organization, having
overall responsibility for the conduct and performance of the
business (e.g. Minichilli, Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010).
Several scholars suggested that firms, where family mem-
bers are involved in the management of the firm, performed
better than their non-family counterparts. Anderson and
Reeb (2003) found that the profitability of a firm is en-
hanced when a family member holds the CEO position. An-
dres (2008) found that German family firms perform better
if the family is actively involved in the firm, either in the
supervisory or executive board. Other researchers found
similar results analyzing data of family firms in Sweden
(Bjuggren & Palmberg, 2010), Taiwan (Chu, 2011), Poland
(Kowalewski et al., 2010), Italy (Minichilli et al., 2010), and
Spain (Sacristan-Navarro et al., 2011a). The next four para-
graphs will outline the underlying argumentation of these
findings.
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Scholars motivated the positive effect of family manage-
ment referring to the same theories and concepts outlined
earlier in this section. First, from an agency theory point of
view, the family can more easily align their interests with
the interest of the company (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Also,
because families often have the majority of their wealth in-
vested in the firm, family CEOs show particular concern over
the business and monitor its development (McConaughy,
Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998). Miller and Le Breton-
Miller (2006) found that the presence of a family CEO is
manifested in fewer short-sighted acquisitions, less down-
sizing actions, and a more long-term nature of capital ex-
penditures and R&D expenses, suggesting that family CEOs
focus more on long-term competitiveness and hence increase
sustainable performance.
Second, scholars attributed the positive performance im-
pact of family management to the fact that family execu-
tives often act as a steward of the organization (e.g. Chu,
2011). They therefore consider the firm as an extension of
their well-being and maximize their utility achieving orga-
nizational objectives (Davis et al., 1997). The continuing
prosperity of the firm is of such importance that they less
likely follow self-serving objectives, thereby enhancing firm
performance (Chu, 2011).
Third, referring to the RBV, scholars argued that a family
CEO might bring specific knowledge, skills and attributes to
the firm which again results in enhanced firm performance.
Dyer (2006) argued that the understanding of the complex-
ities of the business often has been gained in early years
of the life and experiences from family members have been
shared to younger generations, resulting in the development
of human and social capital from which the organization
can benefit. Because family CEOs are well acquainted with
the firm, its established networks, and its corporate strategy
(Chung, Lubatkin, Rogers, & Owers, 1987), CEO candidates
within the family promote stability and profound expertise
(Amran, 2012).
Finally, researchers also argued that family firms where
family members are involved in the management of the firm
do perform better due to the existence of SEW. Because fam-
ily CEOs have an intention to pass over the firm to the next
generation, they are more interested in the survival of the
business (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). This might result in
value maximizing investment behavior (Stein, 1989). Fur-
thermore, family CEOs have a particular incentive to achieve
high firm performance as the reputation of the entire family
might be severely damaged and conflicts among the fam-
ily shareholders might arise (Arrègle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very,
2007). Moreover, family CEOs do often show an altruis-
tic behavior that creates an atmosphere of trust and loyalty
which in turn has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g.
Minichilli et al., 2010).
However, research on the effect of family members in-
volved in the firm’s management on firm performance so far
has been inconclusive. First, some scholars could not find
any significant effect suggesting that the presence of a family
CEO influences firm performance in either way (e.g. Block et
al., 2011; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007).
Second, a growing amount of literature suggests that the re-
lationship between the involvement of the family in the firm
and firm performance is not linear and might be dependent
on other factors. Maseda et al. (2019) found an S-shaped re-
lationship between family ownership of board members and
firm performance suggesting that the family’s involvement
in management might lead to a convergence of interests be-
tween family members and a strengthening of ties between
the family and the business. Perrini and Rossi (2008) found
that family management only affects firm performance pos-
itively when family ownership is low. In the case of high
family ownership, the controlling family members might use
their executive positions to extract private benefits and ex-
propriate minority shareholders. Also De Massis et al. (2013)
argued that family involvement only has a positive impact
on firm performance when family ownership is moderate.
Third, other researchers found even a negative relationship
between family firm involvement and firm performance (e.g.
Giovannini, 2010; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Sindhuja, 2009;
Wong, Chang, & Chen, 2010). The arguments substantiat-
ing a negative relationship between family involvement in
management and firm performance will be outlined in the
following two paragraphs.
First, from an agency point of view, family CEOs might
pursue different objectives than those that would be value-
maximizing for the shareholders. Family CEOs might use the
firm’s resources to the benefit of their families and thereby
expropriate other shareholders (Block et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, family members present in the management often
seek additional forms of compensation such as immaterial
rewards or even reduce their efforts (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling,
& Dino, 2005) since they are not likely to be dismissed from
their position for incompetent behavior (Block et al., 2011).
Second, families often restrict the occupation of top man-
agement positions to family members (e.g. Anderson &
Reeb, 2003). In doing so, they can provide high-paying jobs
to their offspring and gain utility in seeing their successors
managing the business they established (Sacristan-Navarro
et al., 2011a). However, family CEOs might not be as capable
and talented as outside, professional CEOs (Schulze et al.,
2002). Such behavior might also cause resentment by other,
non-family executives (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). De Massis
et al. (2013) argued that outside managers are beneficial for
an organization as they bring business-specific knowledge
and have better access to outside information and resources.
Moreover, outside managers could be beneficial as they not
only prevent negative practices of the family such as the
extraction of private benefits but also could mitigate risks
originating from family firms, for instance by mediating fam-
ily disputes. In short, restricting the talent pool and forgoing
possible benefits from outside managers might explain the
negative relationship between firm performance and family
involvement in management.
Besides the magnitude of ownership and the involvement
of the family in the management of the firm, scholars also
argued that the generation of family owning or managing
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the business impacts firm performance. Reviewing many
family firm definitions in extant academic literature from all
around the world, Miller et al. (2007) noticed that many
studies consider firms, in which there is involvement of only
a lone founder, but no other family member, as a family firm,
making it impossible to differentiate effects on performance
that might originate from the individual structure of the firm.
Only few researchers included lone founder firm as a separate
shareholder structure in their analyses which is why research
on the effect of lone founder ownership on firm performance
is still tentative and not as numerous and fruitful compared
with classical family business research. However, this differ-
entiation is of major importance as approximately one-third
of all family firms worldwide are managed by one or multi-
ple founders, while the remaining two-thirds are managed
by the descendants of the founding family (La Porta et al.,
1999).
When analyzing data of 896 US-American companies be-
tween 1996 and 2000, Miller et al. (2007) found that only
lone founder firms, companies where an individual is one of
the founders of the firm with no other involvement of family
members, outperform firms with other shareholder struc-
tures. The results of their study did not suggest performance
difference between family firms, where more than one family
member is involved, and firms with other types of ownership
structures. Similarly, Villalonga and Amit (2006) provided
evidence suggesting that family ownership only creates value
if there is a founder CEO or if the founder serves as chair-
man of the board of directors with an external CEO in place.
Barontini and Caprio (2006) found that the operating per-
formance and market valuation of 675 European firms were
higher if the firms were controlled by their founders. The
result of the study by Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicated
that the market performance of family firms was only better
in case of the presence of a founder CEO or a professional,
external CEO. The reasoning between the significant per-
formance effect of a founder firm will be outlined in the
following paragraphs.
First, researchers argued that lone founder firms show a
different behavior because of their social context. The im-
portant stakeholders surrounding a lone founder firm are
a diverse group of investors, venture capitalists, employees,
customers, partners, and others (Donaldson & Preston, 1995)
which all have primarily economic interests and demand
high growth in return for their investments in an emerging
company (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011). Greve,
Hitt, Ireland, Camp, and Sexton (2003) argued that these
stakeholders exert pressure on the lone founders aiming at
the exploitation of economic opportunities, enhancement
of customer service, successful positioning in the market,
or out performance of competition. When addressing these
pressures, the founders assume an entrepreneurial, indi-
vidualistic role where the firm can be seen as an extension
of the entrepreneurs themselves (Miller et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, lone founders might play an entrepreneurial role
because they compare themselves with and see similarities
to other entrepreneurs. Because of this entrepreneurial,
growth-oriented role, the performance of lone founder firms
is often associated with a typical strategy of growth charac-
terized by innovation, expansion, and long-term investment
(Miller et al., 2011).
Second, Morck (1988) argued that founder CEOs bring
expertise and skills to the firm that enhance the value of the
business. For example, founder CEOs are assumed to more
likely possess technical and market expertise and a more
organization specific knowledge (Fahlenbrach, 2009). Also
Andres (2008) argued that the special influence and value-
adding skills of founders result in enhanced performance of
the firm. Moreover, founders might also benefit from ex-
perience of success and failure of previous entrepreneurial
activities and based on that incorporate the learnings into
the management of their businesses (Cope, 2011).
Third, researchers referred to the concept of SEW when
trying to explain the founder effect on firm performance (e.g.
Miller et al., 2011). Since the social approval and self image
of the founder often is tied to the success of the business, the
founder has an incentive to make capital investments that
benefit the firm and maximize shareholder value (Kirzner,
1979) thereby enhancing firm performance. However, re-
searchers also assumed less conflicts between the pursuit of
economic goals of the firms and of non-economic goals of
the family: Because lone founders do suffer less from succes-
sion issues and disputes within a family, firm performance is
less likely to be weakened by family firm specific conflicts of
interest (Miller et al., 2007).
To summarize, this section demonstrated how family firms
differ within each other and how the distinct facets of a fam-
ily firm affect firm performance differently. It is building on
the preceding sections about the relationship between family
ownership and firm performance primarily referring to argu-
ments related to agency theory, stewardship theory, RBV, or
the concept of SEW. The complexity of the relation between
family ownership and firm performance has been outlined
and the multitude of effects examined by researchers has
been tried to disentangle. The last section demonstrated
that, when analyzing the impact of family ownership on the
performance of a firm, it should be taken into account how
large the stake held by the family is (magnitude of owner-
ship), how actively the family shapes the management of the
firm (family involvement through board membership) and
whether the firm is owned and managed by a lone founder
rather than descendants or multiple family members of the
founder (generational stage of family firms).
In order to consider the generational stage of the fam-
ily business, for the remainder of this thesis, I differentiate
between Lone Founder Firms and True Family Firms as their
different social contexts may induce distinct behaviors which
in turn might affect firm performance differently. In order
to avoid any possible misunderstanding, true family firm(s)
will be abbreviated by ‘TFF’ and lone founder firm(s) by ‘LFF’
respectively. Since there exists a multitude of definitions of a
family firm in prior academic literature, finding a consensus
on an exact definition is difficult (Miller et al., 2007). For the
shareholder categorization within the course of this analysis,
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I follow the definition of Miller et al. (2007) who suggested
that a TFF is “one in which multiple members of the same
family are involved as major owners or managers, either con-
temporaneously or over time” (p. 836). Furthermore, LFF
were defined as “those in which an individual is one of the
company’s founders with no other family members involved,
and is also an insider (officer or director) or a large owner”
(Miller et al., 2007, p. 837). Following this logic, if family
members are present in the company alongside the active
founders, the firm is categorized as a true family firm.
2.2. Family Firm Performance during the Global Financial
Crisis 2007 – 2009
2.2.1. Global Financial Crisis and Firm Performance in Ger-
many
Minichilli et al. (2016) argued that the analysis of family
firm-specific characteristics influencing the company’s perfor-
mance is subject to several contingencies such as the defi-
nition of TFF or LFF ownership as well as the selection of
performance measures. In order to ensure the consideration
of these contingencies, various robustness tests will be per-
formed later in this thesis (see section 4.3 Robustness). Be-
sides these rather methodical elements, researchers also in-
dicated that the time period considered in the analysis might
play an important role (e.g. Miller et al., 2007). Therefore,
recent academic research on TFF and LFF behavior has called
for a more detailed consideration of potential contingencies
such as the stage of national development and the financial
situation of the economical context the firm is participating
in (Minichilli et al., 2016).
Various researchers argued that the consideration of over-
all economic activity, specifically an economic downturn, will
enrich corporate governance research that focusses on be-
havior of firms with specific ownership types: Lins et al.
(2013) described a financial crisis as a natural experiment
that moves firms out of their equilibrium while the ownership
structure remains unchanged at least temporarily. Therefore,
they further argued, it can be better observed how investors
adjust their expectations of firm performance with distinct
types of ownership structures. Saleh et al. (2017) noted that
the consideration of a situation of financial distress is ben-
eficial as it has direct implications for the decision-making
process, which, in turn, is a function of corporate ownership
structure. More specifically, Minichilli et al. (2016) argued
that firms, when confronted with an economic downturn,
show a more explorative attitude and hence fundamental de-
cisions that directly affect firm performance, such as R&D
investment, M&A activity or expansion strategies, can be ob-
served. Summarizing the above mentioned argumentation,
Van Essen, Strike, Carney, and Sapp (2015) described the cri-
sis situation as magnifying both negative and beneficial char-
acteristics of a TFF and LFF due to the fact that firms have
been moved out of their equilibrium. Following these calls
for a consideration of situational behavior, in this thesis, the
performance of TFF and LFF shall be analyzed in the light of
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 – 2009.
The GFC originated from a bubble in US-American real
estate prices that was caused by loose monetary policy and
global imbalances (F. Allen & Carletti, 2010). The availabil-
ity of funds and the cheap credit contributed to the bubble
and other factors such as high leverages in the banking sec-
tor, weak regulatory frameworks, and subprime mortgages
exacerbated the effects of the bubble, resulting in a national
financial crisis (F. Allen & Carletti, 2010). At that point in
time, although the financial sector being under tremendous
pressure, the real economy was not much affected. However,
on September 15, 2008, the collapse of the American invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers signaled international markets
that there is serious concern about credit risk in the financial
sector, resulting in investors re-assessing risk and withdraw-
ing from markets (F. Allen & Carletti, 2010). The concern
about the financial standing of banks and other institutions
quickly spread all over the world and disrupted economic ac-
tivity, resulting in negative firm performance and investor re-
turns (Saleh et al., 2017). The velocity and magnitude of
the global spreading were unseen, as never before a crisis
of this extent had occurred in the context of well-advanced
globalization and a complex financial system (Breitenfellner
& Wagner, 2010). Moreover, massive risk-taking by financial
institutions such as Lehman Brothers magnified the impact
of the GFC (F. Allen & Carletti, 2010). Aboura and Wagner
(2016) argued that uncertainty and volatility has a strong
negative effect on asset prices and therefore the GFC led to
sharp declines in equity prices, severely affecting the global
economy. Some scholars argued that the impact on world
trade and industrial manufacturing even exceeded the corre-
sponding effect of the Great Depression in 1929, although it
should be noted the comparability with that economic down-
turn is limited due to data availability and data quality as
well as the completely different reactions of monetary and
fiscal policymakers (Fonseca, 2011). In case of the GFC, it
took massive bail-outs of banks and other palliative fiscal and
monetary policies to prevent the global financial system from
collapsing completely (Breitenfellner & Wagner, 2010).
In Germany, the economic system was deeply hit by the
GFC. In 2008, the annual economic growth rate fell to 1.1%
and in 2009 it even became negative, at -5.6% (The World
Bank Group, 2019). Figure 1 shows the development of the
Prime All Share Index over time from 2004 to 2018. The
Prime All Share Index tracks the performance of the entire
German Prime Standard segment. The German Prime Stan-
dard is a market segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
where the sample firms of this analysis are listed. In Jan-
uary 2004, the closing price was 1,515.27 and from there on
the index continuously increased until the end of 2007 up
to 200% of its base value in 2004. In 2008, the index be-
gan to decrease first slowly and then from mid-September
2008 on dropped drastically. The Prime All Share Index
reached its lowest point in March 2009, where its value was
87% (1,325.13 pts.) compared to the base in January 2004.
Thereafter, the economy slowly started to recover (Lins et
al., 2013) and increased steadily until mid-2018 to a level of
347% compared to the initial base. In recent months, eco-
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nomic development has decreased due to political conflicts
destabilizing business activity all over the world (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2019). Figure 2 provides a more de-
tailed view on the development of the Prime All Share Index
during the GFC in order to understand the macro-economic
circumstances the firms inherent in the sample of this anal-
ysis had to face. The impact of the collapse of the invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, can
be clearly seen. From mid-September 2008 to early March
2009, the Prime All Share Index dropped drastically by 43%
from 2,340.05 pts. on the day before the Lehman bankruptcy
to 1,325.13 pts. on March 6, 2009. After reaching this
nadir, the German economy slowly started to recover as a re-
sult of the massively expansionary and fiscal policies (Funk,
2012). However, Figure 1 shows that, even 18 months af-
ter the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the German Prime
Standard was not able to recover to a pre-crisis level. Un-
employment maintained on a higher level and indebtedness
increased considerably in the aftermath of the GFC (Funk,
2012)
2.2.2. Firm Performance of TFF during the GFC
Academic research on how TFF coped with the GFC has led
to inconclusive and even contradictory results (e.g. Arrondo-
García, Fernández-Méndez, & Menéndez-Requejo, 2016).
Using a large data sample of 8,500 firms from 35 countries,
Lins et al. (2013) found that TFF under performed signifi-
cantly during the GFC compared to firms with other share-
holder structures. Specifically, buy and hold crisis period
returns during this time in their study were 1.4 percentage
points lower than for firms with a dispersed shareholder
structure and even 3.3 percentage points lower than for
firms with a controlling non-family blockholder. Lins et al.
(2013) showed empirically that TFF also cut investment
more relative to other firms and further suggested that these
investment cuts are negatively associated with performance.
Specifically, they found that TFF reduced their capital expen-
ditures to assets ratio by 0.52 percentage points compared
to other firms. Those firms in the sample that cut investment
more were found to have greater stock price declines than
other firms.
Researchers have referred to the agency theory when try-
ing to explain the supposedly inferior performance of TFF
during the GFC. Lins et al. (2013) argued that the GFC mag-
nified the inherent conflict of interest between the family and
outside shareholders. For example, in light of an economic
recession, the survival of the family’s economic interests is
of greater importance and hence private benefits of control
have become more costly to minority shareholders. Saleh et
al. (2017) argued that the extreme volatility on global capital
markets created panic among family shareholders because
they often do not possess sufficiently diversified investment
portfolios but rather have their wealth invested in the firm.
The protection of the family’s interest on the expense of
other shareholders has been discussed comprehensively in
the previous chapters of this thesis and the fact that these
survival-oriented actions are especially predominant in times
of crisis has been subject to extensive academic research, re-
ferring to it as the “tunneling” of resources out of the firm
(e.g. Van Essen et al., 2015).
Other scholars, in contrast, provided evidence suggest-
ing that TFF performed better than other firms during the
GFC. Analyzing the entire population of industrial, listed
TFF in Italy, Minichilli et al. (2016) found that TFF con-
sistently and significantly outperformed other firms during
the GFC. Specifically, they found that TFF did not show a
significant performance difference to other firms during a
ten-year-period from 2002 to 2012. During the GFC how-
ever, Minichilli et al. (2016) found that TFF achieved higher
ROE and ROA than other Italian firms. Saleh et al. (2017)
examined the financial performance (ROA and ROE) of 677
Australian firms during the GFC and found that TFF per-
formed significantly better than firms with other shareholder
structures. Analyzing a large data sample of 2,949 firms
across 27 European countries, Van Essen et al. (2015) found
that TFF significantly outperformed during the crisis but
showed no significant differences to other firms during a
period of stable growth (2004 – 2006). In their study, they
used cumulative market-adjusted stock return as an indicator
of market performance. Moreover, Van Essen et al. (2015)
found that TFF are less likely to reduce their workforce or cut
wages during both pre-crisis and crisis periods. Amann and
Jaussaud (2012) provided evidence suggesting that TFF in
Japan showed stronger resilience during the GFC, recovered
faster and exhibited higher performance compared to firms
with other shareholder structures. In their study, Amann
and Jaussaud (2012) formed 98 carefully selected pairs of
one Japanese TFF and one Japanese non-TFF and compared
ROE, ROA, ROI, and net income of the respective firms. As
outlined in the following two paragraphs, researchers have
primarily referred to the concept of SEW and the RBV when
trying to explain the supposedly superior performance of TFF
during the GFC.
With regard to the concept of SEW, scholars argued that,
during a crisis, family shareholders will reduce their empha-
sis on exploiting the family’s SEW advantages and rather
focus on short-term financial performance (e.g. Berrone,
Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). In more detail, prior academic
research has suggested that under stable economic condi-
tions, TFF prioritize SEW over pure economic rationality
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). However, Gomez-Mejia, Cruz,
Berrone, and de Castro (2011) argued that with increas-
ing external hazards, family shareholders more likely make
strategic decisions resulting in a deterioration of SEW for
the benefit of financial performance. Similarly, Patel and
Chrisman (2014) found that TFF minimize risks and avoid
aggressive investing in times where performance meets or
exceeds aspirations but also accept more risks than other
firms in situations where performance is below aspirations.
The willingness to accept greater risks and make strategic
choices might also be fueled by the emotional attachment
and effective commitment of the family, management, em-
ployees, or other stakeholders to the firm (Berrone et al.,
2012). Minichilli et al. (2016) argued that the emotional at-
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tachment and the resulting extraordinary commitment helps
firms to withstand external threats as all forces are concen-
trated to rescue the firm during the economic downturn and
the controlling family will capitalize on their ability to make
a fast decision. Furthermore, researchers argued that the
long-term orientation of TFF is beneficial especially in times
of financial distress. For instance, greater cooperation and
implicit contracts with stakeholders favors the continuance
of the firm (Van Essen et al., 2015).
Scholars also referred to the RBV when trying to explain
the greater resilience of TFF during a crisis. On the one
hand, the controlling family might be willing to prop up the
TFF by injecting private financial resources in order to assure
the long-term survival of the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 2010).
Apart from their private assets, family shareholders might
also provide financing via other firms under their control
in order to maintain employment levels despite declines in
market demand or competitiveness (Lins et al., 2013). On
the other hand, family shareholders might enjoy privileged
access to capital during periods of economic downturns com-
pared to other firms (Minichilli et al., 2016). Crespí-Cladera
and Martín-Oliver (2015) found that TFF have facilitated ac-
cess to debt financing during crises as they more effectively
build long-lasting and trusting relationships with business
partners like financers.
To summarize, scholars consider the GFC as a natural ex-
periment where inherent benefits and disadvantages of TFF
ownership are magnified and hence contribute a further per-
spective to the long-lasting academic debate as to whether
TFF outperform other firms or not. Although Lins et al.
(2013) provided evidence indicating lower firm performance
of TFF during the GFC, those results suggesting a positive
association between TFF ownership and firm performance
are predominant and have been substantiated referring to
renown academic theories and concepts. To my knowledge,
no academic study published in a relevant journal has con-
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sidered the firm performance of TFF in Germany during the
GFC. Therefore, following researchers that formulated sim-
ilar hypotheses for different geographic settings (Amann &
Jaussaud, 2012; Minichilli et al., 2016; Saleh et al., 2017),
I hypothesize that during the GFC, TFF in Germany show a
significantly higher financial performance than non-family
firms.
Hypothesis 1a: During the GFC, TFF ownership of
firms listed in the German Prime Standard is asso-
ciated with higher firm performance compared to
firms with other shareholder structures.
2.2.3. Firm Performance of LFF during the GFC
The role of LFF has not been subject to academic research
to the same extent as the role of TFF during periods of fi-
nancial downturns (Zhou et al., 2012). Arrondo-García et
al. (2016) examined a sample of 6,315 Spanish firms and
found that firm performance during the GFC varied within
the heterogeneous pool of family firms dependent on the
generational stage of the firm. Specifically, first-generation
firms exhibited higher growth, but increased their debt ra-
tios and showed lower ROE compared to multi-generational
family firms. Although not specifically analyzing LFF, the un-
derlying theory explaining the behavior of first-generation
family firms might be analogous to that of LFF. Studying
non-financial firms in the S&P 500 during the GFC, Zhou et
al. (2012) found that, while family firms, in general, out-
performed other firms, especially LFF, a subgroup of family
firms, contributed to the superior performance. Specifically,
Zhou et al. (2012) suggested that the Operating Return on
Assets (OROA) of LFF did not drop at all during the GFC
compared to a pre-crisis level whereas the OROA of TFF de-
clined by 14%, contributing to the relative outperformance of
LFF. Moreover, their results revealed that LFF invested signif-
icantly less and had better access to debt financing during the
GFC. The following two paragraphs will provide an overview
of the underlying argumentation substantiating the findings
suggested by researchers.
On the one hand, Arrondo-García et al. (2016) argued that
younger firms have restricted access to resources and might
not be able to ensure the survival of the firm during the crisis
with the help of investments to the same extent than multi-
generational TFF do. Furthermore, in their perspective, the
emotional attachment and inexperience of founders result in
an excessive commitment and risk-taking that ultimately is
supposed to lead to inferior firm performance compared to
TFF that exist for at least two generations. In such TFF, ac-
cording to Arrondo-García et al. (2016), financial goals are
increasingly important, especially during times of financial
hardship, as the wealth of several family members is at stake.
Moreover, Arrondo-García et al. (2016) expected LFF to have
a disadvantage when entering a crisis as ownership is more
concentrated and hence the founder’s wealth is less likely to
be diversified.
On the other hand, researchers argued that, on the con-
trary, the actions of TFF are impacted by greater emotional at-
tachment and encumbered governance whereas LFF are free
from kinship ties and therefore can make strategic decision
faster and more efficiently, which is especially important dur-
ing times of financial distress (Miller et al., 2007; Zhou et
al., 2012). Furthermore, Zhou et al. (2012) argued that the
focus on the lone founders in LFF plays a pivotal role in dif-
ferentiating them from TFF and therefore firm performance
might be enhanced. Specifically, LFF are free from owner-
manager conflicts or conflicts among shareholders such as
in TFF where disputes between family members might arise
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2010).
To summarize, the literature on the impact of LFF owner-
ship on firm performance during crises is scarce and incon-
clusive. To my knowledge, no study published in relevant
journals has examined the performance of LFF during crisis
within the German jurisdiction. After reviewing literature on
LFF performance in general as well as during crisis periods,
I hypothesize, based on the insights in literature and follow-
ing the conjecture of Zhou et al. (2012), that, during the GFC,
LFF in Germany show a significantly higher financial perfor-
mance than other firms.
Hypothesis 1b: During the GFC, LFF ownership of
firms listed in the German Prime Standard is asso-
ciated with higher firm performance compared to
firms with other shareholder structures.
2.2.4. The Role of the Family CEO during the GFC
Although family management in general being subject reg-
ularly in prior academic literature, the role of family involve-
ment in the management of the firm during a crisis has been
analyzed by researchers only scarcely. In their study of 219
Italian firms, Minichilli et al. (2016) analyzed the interac-
tion of ownership concentration and the presence of a family
CEO in TFF. Interestingly, they found that while during peri-
ods of economic stability a TFF with a family CEO performs
better if the family holds a large share of the firm, during
a crisis this result is reversed. Specifically, they found that
the ROA of Italian TFF during the GFC was higher when a
family CEO was present and family ownership was not con-
centrated, thus the family was not a very large blockholder
of the firm.
Minichilli et al. (2016) argued that governance mecha-
nisms are optimized typically for steady-state conditions and
during contingencies such as the GFC the expenses of given
governance decisions might exceed their benefits. While hav-
ing a family CEO in TFF might be beneficial during stable
economic conditions due to the alignment of interests be-
tween management and owners (Anderson & Reeb, 2003),
the CEO’s behavior as a steward of the organization (Davis
et al., 1997), the CEO’s specific knowledge and skills (Dyer,
2006), or their emotional attachment and transgenerational
intention (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008), family CEOs might
take advantage of the resource distribution during times of
financial distress (Minichilli et al., 2016). Especially because
their wealth is often tied to the firm, the concentration of
ownership and management might induce family CEOs dur-
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ing a crisis to extract capital out of the firm and thus ensure
the survival of the family’s wealth (Minichilli et al., 2016). As
discussed earlier in this thesis, such behavior for the benefit
of the family is at the expense of other, non-family sharehold-
ers and finally results in weaker firm performance. As the
private benefits of control might be especially high during
economic downturns, the cost of family involvement in the
management might outweigh the advantages in these times.
To summarize, the impact on family involvement during
crises on firm performance has not gained much attention
in academic research yet. Although believed to be benefi-
cial during times of stable economic conditions, I hypothe-
size, in line with Minichilli et al. (2016), that the costs of
a governance mechanism entailing concentrated ownership
and management outweigh the benefits during the GFC.
Hypothesis 2: During the GFC, the presence of a
family CEO in TFF listed in the German Prime Stan-
dard is associated with lower firm performance
compared to the performance of TFF with an ex-
ternal CEO.
It should be noted that, with regard to LFF, extant academic
literature most often has not differentiated within LFF re-
garding founder management or external management as
the CEO position in an LFF is most often held by one of the
founders. In my sample, as it can be seen in section 3.4 Inde-
pendent Variable, in 15 out of 32 LFF, one of the founders was
present as CEO. Therefore, a differentiated analysis within
LFF will not lead to statistically relevant results. In fact, the
LFF founder variable was omitted by the software used in the
regression model due to multicollinearity. As a consequence,
for the remainder of this thesis only the presence of a family
CEO will be analyzed while the presence of a founder CEO
or external CEO in a founder firm will be neglected.
3. Methodology
This section describes the composition of the sample used
for the regression, the retrieval of data as well as the depen-
dent, independent, and control variables. Furthermore, the
analytical approach will be outlined.
3.1. Sample
My sample consisted of large German firms listed in the
‘Prime Standard’ at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The Ger-
man market is selected because here a high number of fam-
ily shareholders can be found (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Fur-
thermore, 85% of the German listed firms have at least one
blockholder possessing voting rights of more than 25% (An-
dres, 2008). Therefore, Germany might be a suitable envi-
ronment to explore the performance of family TFF and LFF.
Moreover, the focus on only one specific market increases the
comparability between the firms and their actions as for ex-
ample the jurisdiction and legislative framework is the same.
Prime Standard is the largest market segment with the high-
est transparency standards of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
A listing in the Prime Standard is a requirement for the admis-
sion to one of Deutsche Börse’s selection indices, such as DAX,
MDAX, TecDAX, or SDAX (Deutsche Börse Group, 2019). In
2018, 319 Prime Standard instruments were included in this
market segment. I received the initial dataset containing
the firms listed in the Prime Standard from the WHU Chair
of Family Business that before had reduced the sample to a
total number of 279 individual companies: First, 17 prime
standard instruments have been excluded as they constituted
only preferred shares of companies that have listed both their
ordinary and their preferred shares in the Prime Standard.
Furthermore, 23 companies have been excluded within the
process of data collection and processing due to data incom-
pleteness or data corruption. Out of these 279 firms, 101 had
their IPO after 2005 and therefore could not be considered
in the analysis that compared firm performance during and
prior to the GFC.
The final data set for the main hypothesis therefore con-
tains 178 firms. The primary industries of the sample firms
span nine different one-digit SIC codes including but not lim-
ited to services, manufacturing, real estate, wholesale trade,
mining, agriculture or transportation. Table 1 summarizes
the distribution of the sample firms according to the nine SIC
codes. 50.6% of the firms in my sample are classified as man-
ufacturers (SIC codes 2 and 3). The second-largest segment
is services (27.1%) followed by Transportation & Public Util-
ities (7.9%). Figure 3 shows the age distribution of the firms
present in my sample at the year-end of 2007, shortly before
the crisis period. Although the majority of the firms (59.6%)
have been founded less than 50 years ago, it is striking that
some firms in the sample are several centuries old and thus
might look back on many generations of firm history. The
oldest firms in my sample were the pharmaceutical company
Merck KGaA (founded 1668), followed by ceramics manu-
facturer Villeroy & Boch AG (1748), and Koenig & Bauer AG,
manufacturer of printing presses (1817). Table 2 shows that
the average age of the sample firm was 64.5 years with a
median of 40 years.
With regard to the size of the sample firms at the respective
period (2007), Table 2 shows that, while the average firm had
a market capitalization of 5.21bn € ,the median market cap-
italization was only 0.32bn € . This calls for a deeper anal-
ysis, which is why Figure 4 plots the market capitalization
of all sample firms. It can be clearly seen that there are few
very large firms dominating the segment in terms of firm size.
In total, the aggregated market capitalization of the 178 se-
lected firms amounts to 928.14bn€ . Thereof, the five largest
firms by market capitalization constituted 39.5% alone. In
2007, the largest firms in my sample by market capitaliza-
tion were E.ON SE (91.97bn =C) and Daimler AG (88.15bn
€ ), whereas KPS AG (7.06m € ) and SThilo Wenig&T AG
(8.61m€ ) marked the lower end of the ranking by firm size.
3.2. Data
The data compiled was obtained from multiple sources. All
data collected covers the years 2003 – 2018. The list of the
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Table 1: Sample Firm Industry Classification
Industry SIC-Code Number of Firms Percentage Share
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 1 0.6%
Construction and Mining 1 6 3.4%
Manufacturing (I) 2 23 12.9%
Manufacturing (II) 3 67 37.6%
Transportation & Public Utilities 4 14 7.9%
Wholesale and Retail Trade 5 10 5.6%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 6 7 3.9%
Services (I) 7 40 22.5%
Services (II) 8 10 5.6%
Source: NAICS Association, Own Calculation
Source: Own Calculation
Figure 3: Age Distribution among Sample Firms
Table 2: Sample Firm Descriptive Statistics
N Mean 25th pcl. Median 75th pcl. SD
Age 178 64.51 25.25 40.00 95.00 53.72
Market Capitalization (bn € ) 178 5.21 0.08 0.32 1.93 14.26
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 178 56.58 16.32 43.04 83.49 153.28
Current Ratio 178 2.69 1.23 1.62 2.43 5.63
CF-to-Sales Ratio 178 -20.40 5.38 9.67 14.04 280.75
Source: Own Calculation
319 companies in the German Prime Standard was issued by
Deutsche Börse Group (2019), the operator and owner of the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Financial data of the firms in the
sample such as return ratios, market capitalization, or other
key financials was obtained by Thomson Reuters Eikon. An
initial categorization of the shareholder structure of the firms
has been provided to me by the WHU Chair of Family Busi-
ness. The shareholder structure has been categorized with
the help of the Amadeus database, which is a database of
comparable financial and business information on Europe’s
largest 520,000 public and private companies by Bureau van
Dijk / Moody’s Analytics (Bureau van Dijk, 2019). The ob-
tained data was manually checked for errors and, if neces-
sary, completed using information from the companies’ web-
sites and annual reports. A more detailed description of the
shareholder categorization can be found in section 3.4 inde-
pendent Variables. CEO and founder information, as well as
missing data, have been collected manually.
3.3. Dependent Variable
In order to test my hypotheses, a primary measure indicat-
ing firm performance has to be selected. Several researchers
analyzing effects on firm performance found that their results
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Source: Own Calculation
Figure 4: Distribution of Market Capitalization (2007)
were highly sensitive to the choice of the performance mea-
sure (e.g. Block et al., 2011). Therefore, it is important to
first gain a deeper understanding of the different dimensions
of performance measurement in order to determine which
metrics are beneficial with regard to the analyses conducted
in this thesis.
“Organizational performance is the ultimate dependent
variable of interest for researchers concerned with just about
any area of management” (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & John-
son, 2009, p. 719). In an extensive study reviewing ev-
ery single article in in the Strategic Management Journal,
the Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Journal of International Business Studies, and the
Journal of Management of the last three years, Richard et
al. (2009) found that in 29% of all articles organizational
performance was included as a dependent, independent, or
control variable. The performance measures in these arti-
cles ranged from profitability ratios, such as ROE, to broad
subjective perceptions of performance, such as reputation,
or specific outcomes determining success, like firm survival.
Although subjective performance measures like self-reports
and Likert survey responses might provide a deeper under-
standing of how performance is achieved in individual or-
ganizations, in this quantitative thesis, objective measures
of performance characterized by higher data availability and
firm comparability shall be selected. Researchers gener-
ally categorize objective performance measures into three
categories: Accounting measures, financial market mea-
sures, and mixed accounting and financial market measures
(Richard et al., 2009).
Accounting measures are the most common means of de-
termining firm performance (Richard et al., 2009). Due to
the publication requirement of firm financials, data is readily
available and can be collected in great quantities with the
help of financial data service providers. Leading account-
ing measures that quantify firm performance are Return on
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Invest-
ment (ROI) or Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) but also
sales growth, margins, or market share are often analyzed
by researchers (Richard et al., 2009). However, scholars
must be aware that accounting measures might be distorted
by distinct accounting standards, human error, or decep-
tion. Richard et al. (2009) argued that the rules specified
in accounting standards are not always corresponding to
the actual underlying logic of firm performance. Moreover,
accounting performance measures are rather backward-
looking, focusing on historic activity more than on future
performance (Keats, 1988).
The greatest strength of financial market measures, in
contrast, is that these performance measures are forward-
looking and consider expected future success and cash flows
(Fisher & McGowan, 1983). Apart from expectations about
the future, financial market-based measures also integrate
intangible assets more effectively than accounting measures
do (Richard et al., 2009). Therefore, financial market mea-
sures might more precisely depict the performance of an
organization with core assets that might not be capitalized in
its financials standards due to accounting regulations. Lead-
ing financial market measures are Earnings-per-share (EPS),
Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio), or total shareholder re-
turn (Richard et al., 2009). However, financial market mea-
sures also have limitations. Generally, share price movement
is not only impacted by the actual performance of an orga-
nization but also reflects macroeconomic financial market
volatility, momentum, or irrational investor’s decisions such
as herding behavior (Richard et al., 2009). Furthermore,
financial market measures evaluate the organization as a
whole and therefore the choice of such measures might not
be appropriate when examining the performance impact of
strategic decisions regarding individual products or business
units.
Apart from pure accounting or financial market measures,
there also exist mixed accounting and financial market mea-
sures. Richard et al. (2009). argued that such measures
might constitute a good compromise as they balance the or-
ganization’s risks, which are often not considered in account-
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ing measures, against operational performance matters, that
might not be reflected in financial market measures. One
of the earliest and very popular hybrid measures is Tobin’s
q. It is the ratio of the market value of firm assets and its
replacement cost (Tobin, 1969). In practice, because the
estimation of the replacement value of a firm’s assets is dif-
ficult, researchers calculate the ratio by dividing the market
value of a firm’s equity and liabilities by its corresponding
book values. Other examples of mixed accounting and fi-
nancial market measures are Altman’s Z-Score predicting the
probability of a firm’s bankruptcy using accounting and stock
market metrics (Altman, 1968) or the Economic value added
(EVA) introduced by Stern, Stewart, and Chew (1995) ad-
justing accounting profits for the cost of capital.
To summarize, firm performance is not at all one-dimensional
and the selection of the suitable performance measure is
highly critical. According to Richard et al. (2009), in lit-
erature there can be observed three common practices by
scholars that are spoilt for choice between the extant mul-
titude of performance measures: First, a single measure is
chosen based on a belief, supported by theory and evidence,
that the relationship of this measure with firm performance
exactly serves to analyze the underlying research question.
Second, researchers decrease the significance of the choice
of individual measures by testing the same independent vari-
ables with a set of different performance measures, thus
testing different dependent variables. Third, scholars might
aggregate several dependent variables to one proposition of
a firm’s performance comprising several performance dimen-
sions.
For the purpose of this thesis, I chose to focus on the most
suitable performance measure first and then also consider
other measures during robustness tests, thereby combin-
ing the first and second approach outlined by Richard et al.
(2009). Specifically, firm performance in the main regression
analysis will be depicted by total shareholder return, consti-
tuting a financial market based performance measure. Later,
the same independent variables will be tested using alterna-
tive performance measures, including accounting measures
and mixed accounting and financial market measures. A
more detailed description of these measures can be found in
section 4.3 Robustness
For the evaluation of the companies’ performance, I fol-
lowed other family firm researches (e.g. Miller et al., 2011)
by using the total return for shareholders. In their study
analyzing the prevalence of firm performance measures in
strategy, economics, and finance literature, Richard et al.
(2009) concluded that financial market measures are most
often used and, above all, shareholder return is the single
most preferred instrument representing an organization’s
performance.
The benefit of the total shareholder return is that it consid-
ers not only capital gains realized by stock price movements
but also takes into account dividend pay-outs. In other
words, it accounts for two categories of return: Dividends
or distributions as well as capital appreciation representing
the change in the market price of an asset. Specifically, the
Thomson Reuters Total Return Index shows a “theoretical
growth in value of a share holding over a specified period,
assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase addi-
tional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing price
applicable on the ex-dividend date” (Aalto University School
of Business, 2019, p. 8). Specifically, the return index (RI)











RIt = return index on day t
RI(t−1) = return index on the previous day
Pt = price on the ex-dividend date
P(t−1) = price on the previous day
Dt = d dividend payment associated with ex-dividend date t
Where available, gross dividends are used and tax as well
as re-investment charges are ignored. The price index and
hence the return index is determined using adjusted closing
prices. In case of new issues, return indices are initially based
on annualized dividend until exact data on the actual pay-
ment of the first dividend becomes available.
The total return is accumulated over a time period from
September 14, 2008, the day before the collapse of the in-
vestment bank Lehman Brothers until March 6, 2009, when
the German Prime All Share Index reached rock bottom, as
explained in section 2.2.1 Global Financial Crisis and Firm
Performance. I hereby use a timeframe that is very similar
to that of other researchers examining effects on firm per-
formance during the GFC (e.g. Lins et al., 2013). However,
some researchers used different time spans in their analysis
when examining the effect on performance during the GFC.
For example, Van Essen et al. (2015) argued that the crisis pe-
riod should include the beginnings of the real estate bubble
in the US and therefore determined the period to be analyzed
from 2007 to 2009. In order to consider such contingencies,
I conducted my regression analysis using an alternative crisis
period window. A more detailed description of this contin-
gent analysis can be found in section 4.3 Robustness.
In order to compare my results with a control period before
the GFC, I determined the control window to cover the years
2005 – 2007, a period where there was little if any indication
that a financial crisis with global extent was looming on the
horizon (Lins et al., 2013). This control window hence does
not overlap with either my crisis period from September 14,
2008, until March 6, 2009, or the crisis period used by other
researchers, for instance, Van Essen et al. (2015) , who de-
termined the crisis window to be 2007 – 2009.
Table 3 shows the accumulated shareholder return of the
sample firms both during the crisis window and the con-
trol window prior to the crisis. The impact of the GFC can
be clearly noted: Accumulated over the two-year period be-
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tween January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2006, the share-
holder return was on average 69.9%, demonstrating high
economic growth. Some firms showed exceptional devel-
opments, for example, shareholders of the Capital Stage AG
(nowadays Encavis AG) more than tripled their investments
over two years, with a shareholder return of 366%. Only 13
out of 178 firms exhibited negative accumulated shareholder
returns. During the crisis window, however, the shareholder
return of all but 16 firms was negative. On average, share-
holders lost 44.0% of their investments during a period of
not even six months. The standard deviation during the cri-
sis window was much lower compared to the control win-
dow, indicating that while firms showed very different per-
formance behaviors during stable times, the economic down-
turn hit them rather equally. This is also suggested by the
closer percentiles compared to those before the crisis.
3.4. Independent Variables
In order to test the hypotheses, family firm ownership has
to be assessed. The shareholder structure provided by the
WHU Chair of Family Business was determined as follows:
Major shareholders that own at least 3% of the company’s
shares were manually categorized into families, state, finan-
cial institutions, private equity firms, other firms, and other
individuals. In order to differentiate between TFF and LFF, I
extended this shareholder structure by separating founders
from other individuals who are not founders. In case families
or lone founders held shares not only as a person but also
through investment companies and other affiliated compa-
nies, these stakes were attributed to the respective family or
individual in order to identify and label the ultimate share-
holder. As a result, the owners of a firm were categorized into
seven groups. In addition, the portion of shares in the hands
of public investors holding less than 3% of voting rights
was categorized as free float. It should be noted that the
total percentage of ownership according to Amadeus some-
times exceeded 100% primarily due to ownership changes
throughout the year or minor database errors.
In this study, voting rights, thus the percentage of shares
held by an investor, determine the ownership of a firm.
Throughout prevailing academic literature, most of the
quantitative studies incorporating family ownership use a
dummy variable based on a specific threshold of equity own-
ership or voting rights held by the family (e.g. Andres, 2008;
Kowalewski et al., 2010; Sacristan-Navarro et al., 2011a;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). With regard to family ownership,
Miller et al. (2010), for instance, argued that ownership is, of
course, a matter of degree as the more shares are owned by a
family, the more there is at stake and hence certain behaviors
like for example the tendency towards acquisition changes.
However, it is quite difficult to determine a particular thresh-
old: While many studies use a threshold of 25% family
ownership (e.g. Andres, 2008; Kowalewski et al., 2010) it
is difficult to argue that for instance firms with 24% family
ownership are fundamentally different than firms with 26%
family ownership. Therefore, in alignment with other stud-
ies (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chu, 2009; Hamadi, 2010;
Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). I use ownership as a continuous
variable in my main regression analysis. Nevertheless, in sec-
tion 4.3 Robustness, the regression analysis is repeated using
dummy variables with various thresholds for ownership.
As already discussed in section 2.1.3 Family Firm Hetero-
geneity and Firm Performance, TFF and LFF in this analysis
are defined following Miller et al. (2007). The independent
variable TFF therefore describes the percentage of voting
rights (common shares) held by multiple members of the
same family as of the end of the financial year 2007. The
independent variable LFF describes the percentage of voting
rights (common shares) held by the company’s founder(s)
with no other family members involved as of the end of the
financial year 2007, respectively. Table 6 at the end of this
section summarizes all variables and also provides a more de-
tailed explanation of the variables concerning the ownership
types state, financial institutions, private equity firms, other
firms, and other individuals. Table 4 shows the distribution
of ownership among the 178 sample firms according to the
categorization introduced above. On average, 16.5% percent
of all voting rights of the sample firms are in the hands of a
family and 5.2% are owned by founders with no other family
member involved. However, the averages are across all firms
within the sample and therefore a differentiated perspective
on only those firm including particular ownership types is
required in order to permit qualitative assessments of the
magnitude of ownership. Out of the 178 sample firms, 64
are classified as having TFF-shareholders. On average, these
family shareholders hold 45.8% of voting rights, almost half
of the companies’ shares. Furthermore, 32 firms are clas-
sified as having LFF-shareholders where the founders, on
average, possess 28.8% of voting rights. With regard to the
other ownership types, it can be noted that more than half
of the sample firms (93) have financial institutions as share-
holders and on average the financial institutions hold 24.1%
of voting rights. PE shareholders only hold 15.1% voting
rights on average and state-ownership is the least common
among the sample firms (present in 11 out of 178 firms).
It should be noted that the sum of firms where a specific
ownership type is present (373) by far exceeds the num-
ber of sample firms (178) as in most of the firms, multiple
shareholder types are present. In order to incorporate family
management into the regression analysis, the independent
variable Family - CEO shall be introduced. The importance
of including family management has been discussed exten-
sively during the literature review. Therefore, it comes as
no surprise that a multitude of researchers included family
involvement as an independent variable into the analysis
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2009; Andres, 2008; Minichilli et al.,
2016; Sacristan-Navarro et al., 2011a; Sacristan-Navarro,
Gomez-Anson, & Cabeza-Garcia, 2011b). Since the CEO is
considered the most important powerful decision-maker in a
company (Minichilli et al., 2010), I follow other researchers
and include the family CEO as an independent variable in
my regression model (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2016; Sirmon et
al., 2008). Specifically, FamilyxFamily - CEO is designed as
an interaction term where a dummy variable that is one, if
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Table 3: Accumulated Shareholder Return of Sample Firms
N Mean 25th pcl. Median 75th pcl. SD
Accumulated Pre-Crisis Return
01.01.2005 – 31.12.2006
178 69.9% 36.7% 60.8% 89.0% 0.63
Accumulated Crisis Return
14.09.2008 – 06.03.2009
178 -44.0% -61.0% -41.2% -22.6% 0.38
Source: Own Calculation
Table 4: Ownership Distribution among Sample Firms
N TFF LFF Other Financial PE State Other
Individual Institution
Average % of equity
ownership across all firms 178 16.5% 5.2% 3.5% 12.6% 3.7% 1.6% 10.9%
Number of firms where
ownership type is present 178 64 32 47 93 44 11 82
Average % of equity
ownership among firms with n/a 45.8% 28.8% 13.2% 24.1% 15.1% 25.1% 23.6%
respective ownership type
Source: Own Calculation
the CEO is a member of the family shareholders, and zero
otherwise, is multiplied with the continuous variable TFF
representing the percentage of voting rights held by the
family. Correspondingly, the term FamilyxExternal_CEO rep-
resents the families’ voting rights of a TFF where no family
CEO, but an outside manager holds the CEO position.
As explained earlier, no differentiation with regard to the
management involvement of founders in LFF is made as this
will not lead to statistically relevant results. In fact, the LFF
founder variable was omitted by the software used in the
regression model due to multicollinearity.
Table 5 shows the presence of family and founder CEOs in
the firms. Specifically, while around one third (34.4%) of all
TFF have a family CEO, almost in half of the LFF (46.9%),
one founder holds the CEO position. It is also interesting to
note that when a family CEO is present, the average percent-
age of voting rights is higher than with an external CEO. This
might be due to the fact that in large firms, equity ownership
is more dispersed and external, professional CEOs are more
common. It is especially notable that when there is no LFF
CEO, the average percentage of voting rights by the founders
is only 16.7%, compared to 42.5% ownership when an LFF
CEO is present.
3.5. Control Variables
This study argues that family ownership affects firm per-
formance. It therefore is important to ensure that the anal-
ysis takes other factors influencing firm performance into
account. Consistent with previous studies on family firm
performance (e.g. Lins et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2016;
Van Essen et al., 2015), I therefore control for industry affil-
iation, past performance, firm age, firm size, leverage, and
liquidity. Furthermore, I include ownership types other than
TFF and LFF into the regression.
Other ownership types. In order to separate the effect
originating from family or founder ownership and to bet-
ter understand how ownership structure in general affects
firm performance, I included the following ownership types
in the regression. Other-Individual describe shareholders
or their holdings which are controlled by a maximum of
two non-relative individuals. Financial-Institution are banks,
venture capital funds, insurance firms, mutual or pension
funds, other funds or holding companies. Private equity
firms (PE) are firms that exclusively engage in private eq-
uity activities. Also professionally-managed family offices
are classified as PE as they are assumed to have a similar
nature as classical PE firms (Estrodt, 2003). State describes
government-controlled blockholders. Other describes all
other shareholder types (except for free float), for instance
foundations, cooperatives, anonymous investors or employ-
ees.
Industry affiliation (SIC). I expect that firms belonging to
particular industries might show a different performance
during a crisis than firms in other industries. In order to
control for this industry effects, I grouped the companies in
the sample using the first digit of the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code. The regression analysis there-
fore considers the following industries as control variables:
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Construction and Mining,
Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale
and Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, and
Services.
Past performance (Pre-Crisis-Return). I expect that the
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Table 5: Family Involvement in the Management of Sample Firms
N TFF LFF
Number of firms where ownership type is present 178 64 32
Number of firms where ownership type is present and family member
(founder) is CEO 178 22 15
Percentage of TFF (LFF) with presence of family CEO (founder CEO) 178 34.4% 46.9%
Average % of equity ownership by family (founder) with presence of
family CEO (founder CEO) 178 48.7% 42.5%
Average % of equity ownership by family (founder) with external CEO 179 44.2% 16.7%
Source: Own Calculation
mere fact that firms that have performed better in the past
might also lead to better performance during the regression
period. In order to isolate that effect, I include the com-
pany’s pre-crisis total return for shareholders between 2005
and 2007 in the main regression.
Firm age (ln-IPO). I expect that older firms perform better,
as they tend to have greater management expertise, higher
cash reserves, and might even have survived a crisis in the
past. Especially after the first listing at the stock exchange,
access to capital and supervision by shareholders due to
transparency requirements is higher. Therefore, I include
the natural logarithm of the firms’ age since their IPO, the
difference between the year of the IPO and the respective
year of the regression period. The natural logarithm is used
in order to improve the model fit by altering the scale of
skewed variables, such as firm age and firm size.
Firm size (ln-Cap). I expect that larger firms might tend to
perform better, especially during a crisis, because of greater
management expertise or higher cash reserves. Smaller firms
might lack the management expertise required to navigate a
company through such challenging times. Therefore, I use
the natural logarithm of the market capitalization in order
to control for the firm size.
Leverage (DE_Ratio). I expect that higher leverage affects
firm performance negatively as it tends to magnify profits in
good times but also magnifies losses in bad times like the
GFC (?). A firm that borrows heavily bears a higher risk
of default compared with a less-leveraged firm due to high
interest rates constituting fixed costs or the inability to raise
additional capital due to the higher risk of over-indebtedness
(Castanias, 1983). Leverage in this study is evaluated with
the help of the debt-to-equity ratio, calculated by dividing a
company’s total liabilities by its shareholder equity.
Liquidity (Current_Ratio). I expect that firms with higher
liquidity reserves perform better during a crisis as those firms
with liquidity shortage lack the financial resourced to repay
creditors and therefore might result in a situation of default.
Liquidity is evaluated with the current ratio, calculated by
dividing a firm’s current assets by its current liabilities. The
current ratio therefore measures a company’s ability to repay
short-term liabilities with the available short-term resources
on hand.
Cash flow generation (CF_Sales_Ratio). I expect that firms
that have a greater ability to generate cash out of its sales
perform better during a crisis as they can generate more cash
for each money unit earned than other firms with a lower
cash flow generation ability. The ability to translate sales
into cash is evaluated by the cash flow-to-sales ratio, calcu-
lated by dividing a company’s funds from operations by its
net sales.
3.6. Analytical Approach
All regressions have been performed in StataSE 16 by Stata
corp. For the main regression, I chose a multiple linear re-
gression model using generalized least squares in order to
estimate coefficients. The regression results will be inter-
preted using significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Devi-
ating, non-linear regression models or models with different
dependent variables used for robustness tests are described
in detail in section 4.3 Robustness.
The following formula depicts the main regression analysis:
yi = β0 + β1X i + · · ·+ β1Xn + εi
Where yi = Dependent variable
β0 = Population Y intercept
β1 = Population slope coefficients
X i · · ·Xn = Independent variables and control variables
εi = Random error term
Generally, it should be noted that the independent and
control variables have been lagged by one period (year-end
2007) in order to ensure that they describe the pre-crisis sta-
tus. Thereby, I avoid that variables are already influenced
by the crisis period. For example, the debt-to-equity ratio
serving as the leverage control variable is considered for the
year 2007 and therefore cannot be a consequence of heavy
borrowing during the crises period. Table 6 summarizes the
variables that have been used in the main regression analysis
as well as their purpose, the variable type and the respective
definition.
4. Analyses and Results
This section summarizes the empirical findings of the anal-
yses performed in this thesis. The significant outcomes will
be outlined, and it will be resolved whether the hypotheses
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Table 6: Variable Definitions
Variable Variable Variable Definition
Purpose Type
Crisis_Return Dependent Continuous Accumulated total return for shareholders between Septem-
ber 14, 2008, and March 6, 2009
TFF Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by multi-
ple members of the same family as of the end of the financial
year 2007
LFF Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by the
company’s founder(s) with no other family members in-
volved as of the end of the financial year 2007
FamilyxFamily_CEO Independent Interaction Term Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by multi-
ple members of the same family multiplied with one if the
CEO is a family member as of the end of the financial year
2007 as of the end of the financial year 2007
FamilyxExternal_CEO Independent Interaction Term Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by multi-
ple members of the same family multiplied with one if the
CEO is no member of the owning family as of the end of the
financial year 2007 as of the end of the financial year 2007
Other_Individual Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by indi-
vidual investors with no other family members involved as
of the end of the financial year 2007
Financial_Institution Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by banks,
venture capital funds, insurance firms, mutual or pension
funds, other funds, or holding companies as of the end of
the financial year 2007
PE Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by PE
firms (incl. family professionally managed family offices)
that exclusively engage in private equity activities as of the
end of the financial year 2007.
State Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by the
government / state-controlled blockholders as of the end of
the financial year 2007
Other Independent Continuous Percentage of voting rights (common shares) held by all
other types of shareholders (except free float), i.e. foun-
dations, cooperatives, anonymous investors, management,
or employees as of the end of the financial year 2007
Pre_Crisis_Return Control Continuous Accumulated total return for shareholders between 2007
and 2009
1-digit SIC codes Control Categorical Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of the firm’s
industry
ln_IPO Control Continuous Natural logarithm of the firms’ age since their IPO as of the
end of the financial year 2007
ln_Cap Control Continuous Natural logarithm of the firms’ market capitalization as of
the end of the financial year 2007
DE_Ratio Control Continuous Debt-to-Equity ratio as of the end of the financial year 2007
Current_Ratio Control Continuous Current ratio (current assets / current liabilities) as of the
end of the financial year 2007
CF_Sales_Ratio Control Continuous Cash flow-to-sales ratio (funds from operations / net sales)
as of the end of the financial year 2007
Source: Miller et al. (2007), Own Compilation
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can be supported or not. The section is structured as follows:
First, descriptive statistics including means, standard devi-
ations, and correlations among the variables are presented.
Thereafter, the main regression results will be outlined in or-
der to conclude whether the hypotheses derived throughout
this thesis can be supported. Finally, several robustness tests
increase the quality of research by testing resistance to vari-
able definitions, choice of dependent variables, determina-
tion of the crisis window, or selection of the analytical ap-
proach. Finally, further empirical analyses related to deci-
sions about personnel, capital structure, and capital expen-
ditures provide further insights into the behavior of TFF and
LFF during the GFC.
4.1. Descriptive Results
Table 7 summarizes the empirical correlations among the
dependent, independent, and control variables, including
means and standard deviations and excluding interaction
terms. The dependent variable, Crisis_Return, shows a sig-
nificant positive correlation with LFF (p<0.05), but not with
TFF. Furthermore, Other_Individual (p < 0.05) correlates
positively with accumulated total shareholder return during
the GFC. Performance during the control window prior to
the crisis is positively correlated with Financial_Institution
(p < 0.01) and Current_Ratio (p < 0.01). Furthermore,
there is a slight negative correlation between CF_Sales_Ratio
and Pre_Crisis_Return. It is also noteworthy that LFF owner-
ship is negatively associated with firm size (ln_Cap, p < 0.01)
and firm age (ln_IPO, p < 0.01) which is intuitive as the
founders are still present and therefore the firms cannot be
as old as multigenerational TFF and often are smaller due
to the relatively early stage of business. TFF ownership,
analogously, is positively associated with firm age (p < 0.1).
4.2. Main Regression Results
Table 8 shows the regression results for the first regres-
sion. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are tested in Model 2, where
total shareholder return is accumulated during the crisis pe-
riod from September 14, 2008, until March 6, 2009. Model
1 performs the same analysis, only that the total shareholder
return is accumulated over the period 2005 – 2007. Further-
more, pre-crisis return is introduced as a control variable in
Model 2 in order to test whether the performance is impacted
by prior performance.
The first independent variable, TFF does not seem to have
any significant effect on firm performance during the crisis
(p > 0.1). Therefore, the results do not support hypothesis
1a. Interestingly, there is a significant effect of TFF owner-
ship on firm performance during the control window prior
to the GFC (p < 0.1,β = 0.302). The positive coefficient
implies that TFF ownership is positively associated with to-
tal shareholder return, suggesting that TFF exhibit superior
performance during a period of stable economic conditions.
The second independent variable, LFF, is significant during
the crisis period (p < 0.05,β = 0.425). The positive coef-
ficient implies that LFF ownership is positively associated
with total shareholder return, suggesting that LFF exhibit
superior performance during a period of financial distress.
Therefore, the results do support hypothesis 1b. During the
pre-crisis period 2005 – 2007, no significant performance
effect relating to LFF ownership can be observed (p > 0.1).
With regard to other categories of firms analyzed in this
study, only a few ownership types show significant effects,
and when they do, then only for one of the periods examined.
First, and most notable, state ownership is positively and
highly significantly associated with firm performance during
crisis (p < 0.01,β = 1.323). This result might indicate that
investors had higher expectations for firms where the gov-
ernment was a large shareholder as these firms might benefit
from preferential treatment with regard to financial bailouts
by the government. Second, also firms where other individ-
uals like single investors were major shareholders showed
superior performance during the GFC (p < 0.1,β = 0.624).
Third, ownership by financial institutions is positively asso-
ciated with performance in the control window prior to the
crisis (p < 0.05,β = 0.573). During the GFC, however, hav-
ing financial institutions as shareholders had no significant
effect on firm performance.
Although I expected firms belonging to different indus-
tries to behave differently, almost no significant associations
between industry group membership and firm performance
can be observed. With regard to other control variables,
age does not seem to be significant for firm performance,
either (p > 0.1). Firm size is only significant during the
control window prior to the GFC (p < 0.1,β = 0.0518).
The Debt-to-Equity ratio, not significant before crisis, is
negatively associated with performance during the GFC
(p < 0.1,β = −0.000315), suggesting that a higher indebt-
edness resulted in inferior performance during the crisis.
The current ratio exhibits a positive significant effect on firm
performance both during (p < 0.1,β = 0.00993) and before
the crisis (p < 0.01,β = 0.0412). The Cash-flow-to-sales
ratio, in contrast, is not significant with regard to firm per-
formance during neither period.
The strength of the relationship between the model and
the dependent variable is expressed by the R-squared. The
R-squared is the percentage of the dependent variable vari-
ation that is explained by the linear regression model and
therefore is always between zero and one. The R-squared
value of the model during the crisis and before the crisis
is 0.234 and 0.284, respectively. This suggests, that 23.4%
(28.4%) of the variance of accumulated total shareholder
return during (before) the crisis can be explained by the
model. The R-squared adjusted penalizes the analysis as ad-
ditional variables that do not enhance the explanatory power
of the model are included in the model. The lower R-squared
adjusted during both periods indicates that the inclusion of
some of the control variables did not improve overall fit of
the model.
Table 9 shows the second regression analysis. The depen-
dent variable and the regression model are identical, but
in this setting, the independent variable TFF is replaced by
two interaction terms where the effect of family ownership
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Crisis_Return -0.44 0.38 1.0000
2. Pre_Crisis_Return 0.70 0.63 0.0038 1.0000
3. TFF 0.16 0.27 0.0070 0.0275 1.0000
4. LFF 0.05 0.15 .1518** 0.0562 -0.2109*** 1.0000
5. Other_Individual 0.03 0.08 0.1542** -0.0633 -0.1099 0.0281 1.0000
6. Financial_Institution 0.13 0.20 -0.0244 0.2828*** -0.1652** -0.1608** -0.0610 1.0000
7. PE 0.04 0.11 0.0063 -0.0889 -0.0180 -0.0963 -0.0069 -0.0520
8. State 0.02 0.08 0.0916 -0.0133 -0.0995 -0.0688 -0.0296 -0.0687
9. Other 0.11 0.22 0.0304 -0.0491 -0.1442* -0.0848 -0.0822 0.0108
10. ln_IPO 2.42 0.59 -0.0700 -0.0402 0.1395* -0.2646*** -0.1083 0.0159
11. ln_Cap 13.08 2.21 -0.1206 -0.0057 0.0794 -0.2930*** -0.1340* 0.0324
12. DE_Ratio 56.58 153.72 -0.1111 -0.0511 -0.0476 -0.0482 0.0008 0.0220
13. Current_Ratio 2.69 5.64 0.0888 0.3827*** -0.0776 0.0372 0.0699 0.2164***
14. CF_Sales_Ratio -20.40 284.54 -0.1228 -0.1392* 0.0684 0.0129 -0.0633 -0.0426








8. State -0.0445 1.0000
9. Other -0.0611 0.0231 1.0000
10. ln_IPO -0.0287 -0.0341 -0.0041 1.0000
11. ln_Cap -0.1301* 0.2382*** 0.1081 0.5098*** 1.0000
12. DE_Ratio 0.1549** 0.1482** 0.0457 0.0162 0.1830** 1.0000
13. Current_Ratio -0.0647 -0.0558 -0.0589 -0.0979 -0.1925** -0.0712 1.0000
14. CF_Sales_Ratio -0.0008 0.0238 0.0404 0.0686 0.1074 0.0416 -0.2039*** 1.0000
Source: Own calculation. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
on firm performance is conditioned on whether the firm is
managed by a family CEO or an external CEO. With regard
to all other variables except FamilyxFamily_CEO and Fami-
lyxExternalCEO, the regression results are naturally almost
identical to the first regression.
The independent variable FamilyxFamily_CEO, hence the
share of family ownership in case a family member holds
the CEO position, is not significant during the crisis period
(p > 0.1). Therefore, hypothesis 2 cannot be supported.
However, the results suggest that there is a significant re-
lationship between the presence of a family CEO and the
accumulated shareholder return in the years 2005 – 2007,
prior to the GFC (p < 0.1,β = 0.501). The positive coeffi-
cient implies that family management is beneficial for firm
performance during periods of stable economic conditions.
The analogous independent variable FamilyxFamily_CEO,
hence the share of family ownership in case the CEO position
is held by an external manager, is not significant in either
period (p > 0.1) and thus the presence of an external CEO
seems to have no impact on total shareholder return.
The coefficient of determination, R-squared, and also the R-
squared adjusted are slightly higher than in the first regres-
sion analysis, suggesting that the differentiation within TFF
helped to increase the explanatory power of the model.
4.3. Robustness
In this section, several robustness tests will be performed.
It shall be analyzed whether the results are influenced by spe-
cific variable definitions or analytical methods. Therefore,
the regression analysis is repeated using alternative perfor-
mance measures, alternative blockholder definitions, an al-
ternative crisis period window, as well as an alternative ana-
lytical approach.
4.3.1. Alternative Firm Performance Measures
In their meta-study, Block et al. (2011) found that the
results of studies examining family firm performance were
highly sensitive to the choice of the performance measure.
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Table 8: Regression Results TFF and LFF


















group(SIC) = 2 0.359 -0.341
(0.625) (0.392)
group(SIC) = 3 0.145 -0.392
(0.589) (0.369)
group(SIC) = 4 0.243 -0.484
(0.582) (0.365)
group(SIC) = 5 0.130 -0.687*
(0.613) (0.384)
group(SIC) = 6 0.206 -0.325
(0.607) (0.380)
group(SIC) = 7 0.887 -0.402
(0.627) (0.396)
group(SIC) = 8 0.443 -0.185
(0.590) (0.370)
















R-squared adjusted 0.192 0.131
Source: Own Calculation
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Regression Results Family CEO




















group(SIC) = 2 0.454 -0.277
(0.631) (0.396)
group(SIC) = 3 0.237 -0.331
(0.595) (0.373)
group(SIC) = 4 0.347 -0.415
(0.590) (0.370)
group(SIC) = 5 0.226 -0.624
(0.619) (0.388)
group(SIC) = 6 0.277 -0.277
(0.611) (0.383)
group(SIC) = 7 0.993 -0.328
(0.635) (0.401)
group(SIC) = 8 0.536 -0.123
(0.596) (0.374)
















R-squared adjusted 0.193 0.132
Source: Own Calculation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In section 3.3 Dependent Variable, the categorization of per-
formance measures into accounting measures, financial mar-
ket measures and mixed accounting and financial market
measures according to Richard et al. (2009) has been in-
troduced. In order to test the robustness of the main result,
where the financial market-based performance measure total
shareholder return was used, the following Table 10 shows
a regression using popular accounting measures as well as
mixed accounting and financial market measures.
One major disadvantage of accounting measures, and
therefore also of mixed measures, is that they cannot be ob-
served on a daily basis like financial measures but rather are
reported at least on an annual basis. Therefore, it is impossi-
ble to measure performance over the exact crisis period that
has been used for the main regression. Because account-
ing measures are rather backward-looking (Keats, 1988),
for the purpose of this analysis, the accounting performance
measures are the sum of the year-end reported measures
by Reuters Eikon of the years 2008 and 2009. Thereby, the
crisis period as defined in the main regression is included. In
order to compare the results against stable economic condi-
tions before the GFC, I also aggregated the same dependent
variables over the years 2005 and 2006.
Please note that Table 10 shows shortened regression re-
sults. For improved visualization, some control variables
that have not been significant like the industry groups or
past performance are not displayed. For a full regression
table, including all variables, please refer to Appendix 1. I
tested the different ownership types against four alternative
performance measures both during and before the GFC.
ROE has been computed as the net income before extraor-
dinary items for the fiscal year divided by the same period
average total equity and is expressed as a percentage. Sur-
prisingly, no single ownership type has a significant effect
on ROE. Furthermore, the goodness-of-fit measure R-squared
during the crisis is relatively low (0.125) and the R-squared
adjusted close to zero (0.007), suggesting that the overall
model does not explain much of the ROE’s variance and the
choice of variables might not be optimal for this analysis.
To conclude, neither hypothesis 1a nor hypothesis 1b can be
supported.
Examining ROA, in contrast, reveals interesting results.
ROA represents the return on assets after taxes. It is calcu-
lated as net income before extraordinary items for the fiscal
year divided by the average total assets for the same period
and is expressed as a percentage. Interestingly, TFF own-
ership is significant both before (p < 0.01,β = 18.05) and
during the crisis (p < 0.1,β = 12.59). The indication of this
result is twofold. First, although only significant at a 10%
level, TFF seem to have performed superior in terms of ROA
compared to other firms during the GFC. This supports hy-
pothesis 1a. Second, TFF generally seem to perform better
than other firms during the period of stable economic condi-
tions prior to the GFC. LFF ownership is not significant and
therefore seems to have no effect on firm performance nei-
ther before nor during the crisis. Therefore, hypothesis 1b
cannot be supported. Another interesting result is that PE
ownership is negatively associated with ROA performance
on a 1% significance level (p < 0.01,β = −49.08). Over-
all, the R-squared during the crisis is relatively high (0.466)
and also the R-squared adjusted (0.395) indicates that the
relationship between the dependent variable and the model
is quite good.
Also the analysis of the ROIC reveals significant results
with regard to the effect of ownership types. ROIC is cal-
culated as income after tax for the fiscal year divided by the
same period average total long-term capital and is expressed
as a percentage. Total long-term capital represents the sum
of total equity, total long-term debt, deferred income tax and
total other liabilities. When measuring performance with the
ROIC, TFF ownership is only significant in the period prior to
the GFC (p < 0.05,β = 28.17), but not during the crisis it-
self. LFF ownership is not significant and therefore seems to
have no effect on firm performance neither before nor during
the crisis. Therefore, neither hypothesis 1a nor hypothesis
1b can be supported. Similar to ROA performance, PE own-
ership has a significantly negative effect on the firm’s ROIC
(p < 0.01,β = −1,481). Again, R-squared (0.440) and R-
squared adjusted (0.365) suggest a good model fit.
The fourth alternative performance measure is a mixed ac-
counting and financial market-based measure, Tobin’s q. It is
the ratio of the market value of firm assets and its replace-
ment cost (Tobin, 1969). Because the estimation of the re-
placement value of a firm’s assets is difficult, I calculated the
ratio by dividing the market value of a firm’s assets by its cor-
responding book values. Specifically, I follow the approach
of Chung and Pruitt (1994) who simplified the calculation
of Tobin’s q by dividing the sum of the market value of eq-
uity, hence the market capitalization, at the end of the year
and the book value of debt by the book value of total as-
sets. The market-to-book value is considered a useful mea-
sure of firm performance as the valuation of the firm is de-
termined by market participants who evaluate the firms and
their prospects (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Neither TFF nor LFF ownership has a significant effect on
the firms’ Tobin’s q during the GFC, providing no support for
hypotheses 1a and 1b. It should be noted, however, that
TFF ownership is positively associated with firm performance
(p < 0.1,β = 1.673) when examining the effect during
the control window 2005 – 2007 where economic conditions
were stable. Interestingly, firm age since the IPO had a signif-
icant negative effect both prior and during the GFC. Overall,
the R-squared during the crisis is highest (0.489) compared
with all other performance measures and also the R-squared
adjusted (0.420) indicates that the relationship between the
dependent variable and the model is quite good.
Table 11 shows the same dependent variables. However, this
time the independent variable TFF is separated into Fami-
lyxFamily_CEO and FamilyxExternalCEO, analogously to the
main regression. Regardless of the performance measure,
family CEO presence was not significant during the crisis
and therefore no effect on firm performance can be sug-
gested by the results. Therefore, hypothesis 2 cannot be sup-
ported. However, in the period 2005 – 2007, prior to the
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Table 10: Robustness – Regression (shortened) including Alternative Performance Measures
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
VARIABLES Pre-Crisis ROE Crisis ROE Pre-Crisis ROA Crisis ROA Pre-Crisis ROIC Crisis ROIC Pre-Crisis TobinsQ Crisis TobinsQ
TFF 57.70 50.03 18.05*** 12.59* 28.17** 26.32 1.673* 0.327
(35.79) (35.94) (6.767) (6.739) (12.75) (68.90) (0.921) (0.451)
LFF 12.19 0.444 7.327 -3.485 16.44 -104.7 2.321 1.062
(66.72) (66.81) (12.62) (12.53) (23.76) (128.1) (1.717) (0.838)
Other_Individual 53.02 60.98 13.25 11.46 -4.723 127.2 3.226 0.0286
(111.9) (111.5) (21.16) (20.91) (39.86) (213.7) (2.879) (1.398)
Financial_Institution 13.31 -1.239 2.022 -6.364 -0.125 28.11 0.665 -0.125
(48.30) (48.92) (9.132) (9.173) (17.20) (93.78) (1.243) (0.613)
PE 79.61 81.47 3.728 -49.08*** 23.51 -1,481*** -0.986 1.353
(79.87) (79.49) (15.10) (14.90) (28.44) (152.4) (2.055) (0.997)
State -21.93 -30.68 -7.683 -4.074 -15.81 17.42 -3.493 -1.375
(128.0) (127.5) (24.20) (23.91) (45.59) (244.4) (3.293) (1.598)
Other 41.62 44.10 7.702 8.698 19.62 -2.895 0.0652 -0.419
(41.46) (41.29) (7.839) (7.742) (14.77) (79.15) (1.067) (0.518)
ln_IPO -11.65 -10.44 0.997 2.170 -2.025 30.50 -1.122** -0.682**
(18.46) (18.39) (3.491) (3.448) (6.576) (35.26) (0.475) (0.231)
ln_Cap 12.92** 11.61** 2.000* 1.921* 5.569*** 3.066 0.335** 0.212***
(5.460) (5.495) (1.032) (1.030) (1.944) (10.53) (0.140) (0.0689)
DE_Ratio -0.0129 -0.00762 -0.00771 -0.0157 -0.0195 -0.166 -0.00150 -0.000793
(0.0588) (0.0587) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0210) (0.112) (0.00151) (0.000735)
Current_Ratio 3.171* 2.125 1.787*** -0.377 2.147*** -2.410 -0.0113 -0.0182
(1.701) (1.815) (0.322) (0.340) (0.606) (3.480) (0.0438) (0.0228)
CF_Sales_Ratio 0.0282 0.0344 0.0268*** 0.0489*** 0.0290** 0.0491 -0.00327*** -0.00440***
(0.0340) (0.0341) (0.00644) (0.00639) (0.0121) (0.0654) (0.000876) (0.000428)
Constant -164.4 -154.7 -33.41 -24.56 -73.72 9.363 1.293 2.766
(137.8) (137.3) (26.05) (25.74) (49.08) (263.1) (3.545) (1.721)
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.111 0.125 0.296 0.466 0.211 0.440 0.183 0.489
R-squared adjusted -0.003 0.007 0.207 0.395 0.111 0.365 0.079 0.420
Source: Own Calculation; Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
GFC, the presence of a family CEO has a significant posi-
tive impact when performance is measured by ROA (p <
0.01,β = 26.32) or ROIC (p < 0.05,β = 37.91). The pres-
ence of an external CEO, that is not part of the owning fam-
ily, has a positive, but only slightly significant effect on ROA
performance both prior (p < 0.1,β = 13.48) and during
(p < 0.1,β = 13.27) the GFC. There seems to be no signif-
icant relationship between the presence of an external CEO
and other firm performance measures.
4.3.2. Alternative TFF and LFF Definitions
Researchers argued that despite the existence of wide-
ranging family business literature, finding a consensus on
the exact definition of a TFF or LFF is difficult (Miller et
al., 2007). In many studies, TFF or LFF status is defined
by the circumstance that the voting rights or equity held by
the owning family or owning founders exceed a particular
threshold. However, there has been no conclusive opinion in
academic research about how high exactly such a threshold
should be. Reviewing studies from family business literature,
I found that researchers used a variety of different thresh-
olds ranging from 5% (M. P. Allen & Panian, 1982; Miller et
al., 2010) to 10% (Sacristan-Navarro et al., 2011b) to 20%
(Arosa et al., 2010; Faccio & Lang, 2002) to 25% (Andres,
2008; Kowalewski et al., 2010) to 33% (Barth, Gulbrandsen,
& Schønea, 2005) to 50% (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Wong et
al., 2010) to 51% (Barontini & Caprio, 2006).
In order to test whether my regression analysis is robust
to the independent variable definition, I follow a similar
approach as mentioned above and create dummy variables
for all ownership types that are one, if the voting rights or
equity held by the owning family or owning founders exceed
the respective threshold and zero, otherwise. By performing
the same regression but with several different thresholds,
I want to ensure to obtain results that can be traced back
to the ownership structure independent from the respective
thresholds themselves.
Specifically, I tested the effect of ownership structure on
accumulated total shareholder return during and before the
GFC using thresholds of 25%, 30%, and 50%. In the first
model, family or founder shareholder must hold at least half
of all voting rights of the firm, hence are by all means the
single largest shareholder in the firm and always have the
absolute majority in the firm. In my sample, 32 TFF and
six LFF fulfill this criterion. The dummy variable for TFF is
not significant neither before nor during the GFC. The LFF
dummy, however, is significant with a positive coefficient in
the period prior to the crisis (p < 0.05,β = 0.589), indicat-
ing that LFF, where the founders hold 50% of voting rights,
performed better than firms with other types of blockholders
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Table 11: Robustness – Regression (shortened) including Alternative Performance Measures and Family CEO
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
VARIABLES Pre-Crisis ROE Crisis ROE Pre-Crisis ROA Crisis ROA Pre-Crisis ROIC Crisis ROIC Pre-Crisis TobinsQ Crisis TobinsQ
FamilyxFamily_CEO 78.96 66.53 26.32*** 11.31 37.91** -28.39 2.187 0.891
(51.90) (52.29) (9.780) (9.809) (18.47) (100.1) (1.335) (0.653)
FamilyxExternalCEO 45.94 41.18 13.48* 13.27* 22.78 55.65 1.388 0.0250
(41.43) (41.37) (7.808) (7.760) (14.75) (79.20) (1.066) (0.517)
LFF 14.31 2.340 8.148 -3.632 17.41 -111.0 2.372 1.127
(66.97) (67.12) (12.62) (12.59) (23.84) (128.5) (1.723) (0.838)
Other_Individual 54.65 62.04 13.89 11.38 -3.975 123.7 3.265 0.0650
(112.2) (111.8) (21.14) (20.98) (39.93) (214.1) (2.887) (1.396)
Financial_Institution 13.24 -0.956 1.993 -6.386 -0.160 27.17 0.663 -0.115
(48.40) (49.05) (9.121) (9.203) (17.23) (93.92) (1.245) (0.613)
PE 83.22 84.20 5.134 -49.29*** 25.16 -1,490*** -0.899 1.446
(80.29) (79.94) (15.13) (15.00) (28.58) (153.1) (2.066) (0.998)
State -23.75 -31.87 -8.391 -3.981 -16.64 21.38 -3.537 -1.415
(128.3) (127.9) (24.18) (23.99) (45.67) (244.8) (3.302) (1.597)
Other 40.81 43.42 7.387 8.751 19.25 -0.643 0.0456 -0.442
(41.57) (41.42) (7.835) (7.772) (14.80) (79.31) (1.070) (0.517)
ln_IPO -11.93 -10.68 0.891 2.188 -2.150 31.29 -1.128** -0.690***
(18.51) (18.45) (3.488) (3.461) (6.588) (35.32) (0.476) (0.230)
ln_Cap 13.38** 11.99** 2.177** 1.892* 5.777*** 1.809 0.346** 0.225***
(5.530) (5.578) (1.042) (1.046) (1.968) (10.68) (0.142) (0.0697)
DE_Ratio -0.0137 -0.00836 -0.00802 -0.0157 -0.0199 -0.163 -0.00152 -0.000818
(0.0590) (0.0588) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0210) (0.113) (0.00152) (0.000735)
Current_Ratio 3.198* 2.171 1.798*** -0.380 2.159*** -2.561 -0.0106 -0.0166
(1.705) (1.823) (0.321) (0.342) (0.607) (3.491) (0.0439) (0.0228)
CF_Sales_Ratio 0.0281 0.0342 0.0267*** 0.0489*** 0.0290** 0.0497 -0.00327*** -0.00441***
(0.0341) (0.0342) (0.00643) (0.00641) (0.0121) (0.0655) (0.000878) (0.000427)
Constant -180.1 -167.1 -39.55 -23.60 -80.96 50.32 0.910 2.344
(140.9) (140.5) (26.55) (26.36) (50.14) (269.0) (3.625) (1.755)
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.113 0.126 0.302 0.466 0.214 0.442 0.184 0.493
R-squared adjusted -0.0069 0.002 0.209 0.391 0.108 0.363 0.074 0.421
Source: Own Calculation
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
holding 50% of voting rights in that period.
According to the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover
Act, control is defined as the holding of at least 30% of the
voting rights of a company (§291WpŪG). The threshold of
30% was chosen because in many cases the majority of the
voting rights represented are already attained in a general
meeting, where not all shareholders are present. I therefore
tested the impact on firm performance in the second model
under the condition that the family or founder shareholders
must hold at least 30% of all voting rights of the firm. In
my sample, 46 TFF and 13 LFF fulfill this criterion. The
dummy variable for TFF is not significant neither before nor
during the GFC. The LFF dummy, however, is significant with
a positive coefficient during the crisis (p < 0.1,β = 0.217),
indicating that LFF, where the founders hold 30% of voting
rights or more, performed better than firms with other types
of blockholders holding at least 30% of voting rights during
the GFC.
Finally, I repeated the same analysis using a threshold
of 25%. According to the European Commission (2019),
“Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise
if the person who established or acquired the firm (share
capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per
cent of the decision-making rights mandated by their share
capital” (p.1). This time, 50 TFF and 16 LFF of my sam-
ple fulfill this criterion. Using this threshold, both TFF
(p < 0.1,β = 0.117) and LFF (p < 0.1,β = 0.118) are
significant and seem to have a positive impact during the
GFC. However, prior to the crisis, TFF or LFF did not per-
form differently than firms with other types of blockholders
holding at least 25% of voting rights prior to the crisis. This
result would support hypothesis 1a and 1b as it emphasized
the superior performance of TFF and LFF during the GFC.
To summarize, choosing different thresholds defining the
independent variables led to different results. Although there
is a tendency that TFF and LFF might outperform other firms
in some economic conditions and dependent on specific vari-
able definitions, no conclusive observations across the differ-
ent models can be made. As explained earlier, this approach
has some important limitations. For instance, it is difficult to
argue that for example firms with 24% family ownership are
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Table 12: Robustness – Regression including Alternative Independent Variable Definitions
DV: Total shareholder return (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
VARIABLES Pre_Crisis Crisis Pre_Crisis Crisis Pre_Crisis Crisis
50% 50% 30% 30% 25% 25%
TFF_Dummy 0.161 0.0120 0.0810 0.0816 0.151 0.117*
(0.118) (0.0771) (0.110) (0.0684) (0.107) (0.0680)
LFF_Dummy 0.589** 0.191 0.00663 0.217* -0.0349 0.180*
(0.246) (0.164) (0.183) (0.114) (0.171) (0.108)
Other_Individual_Dummy -0.403 0.329 0.00337 0.331* -0.294 0.248
(0.414) (0.271) (0.306) (0.191) (0.250) (0.159)
Financial_Institution_Dummy 0.341** 0.0240 0.141 0.0493 0.0928 0.0650
(0.172) (0.113) (0.136) (0.0853) (0.132) (0.0832)
PE_Dummy -0.180 -0.0309 0.188 0.0483 0.220 0.0692
(0.339) (0.221) (0.305) (0.191) (0.237) (0.150)
State_Dummy 0.121 0.449 -0.255 0.481** 0.188 0.413**
(0.437) (0.285) (0.362) (0.226) (0.306) (0.193)
Other_Dummy -0.0320 0.00249 -0.00123 0.0182 -0.116 0.00686
(0.177) (0.116) (0.138) (0.0862) (0.126) (0.0796)
Pre_Crisis_Return -0.0428 -0.0307 -0.0395
(0.0520) (0.0497) (0.0503)
group(SIC) = 2 0.270 -0.401 0.369 -0.315 0.486 -0.296
(0.615) (0.401) (0.641) (0.400) (0.635) (0.401)
group(SIC) = 3 0.101 -0.421 0.166 -0.375 0.244 -0.368
(0.585) (0.381) (0.603) (0.376) (0.596) (0.376)
group(SIC) = 4 0.188 -0.507 0.253 -0.451 0.330 -0.442
(0.576) (0.376) (0.597) (0.372) (0.590) (0.372)
group(SIC) = 5 0.0887 -0.583 0.253 -0.586 0.267 -0.565
(0.603) (0.393) (0.630) (0.393) (0.621) (0.392)
group(SIC) = 6 0.117 -0.310 0.180 -0.291 0.267 -0.279
(0.602) (0.392) (0.620) (0.387) (0.613) (0.387)
group(SIC) = 7 0.894 -0.447 0.979 -0.398 1.104* -0.389
(0.614) (0.403) (0.640) (0.402) (0.636) (0.405)
group(SIC) = 8 0.356 -0.200 0.464 -0.151 0.555 -0.143
(0.585) (0.382) (0.606) (0.378) (0.599) (0.379)
group(SIC) = 9 0.0678 -0.190 0.0772 -0.102 0.240 -0.0766
(0.611) (0.398) (0.635) (0.396) (0.629) (0.397)
ln_IPO -0.0456 0.0337 -0.0694 0.0469 -0.0588 0.0377
(0.0912) (0.0595) (0.0946) (0.0590) (0.0928) (0.0586)
ln_Cap 0.0573** 0.00209 0.0550** 0.00107 0.0508* 0.00348
(0.0262) (0.0174) (0.0276) (0.0174) (0.0276) (0.0176)
DE_Ratio -0.000222 -0.000245 -0.000233 -0.000316* -0.000313 -0.000309
(0.000288) (0.000188) (0.000299) (0.000187) (0.000298) (0.000189)
Current_Ratio 0.0401*** 0.00843 0.0427*** 0.00936 0.0437*** 0.00982*
(0.00845) (0.00589) (0.00860) (0.00577) (0.00851) (0.00580)
CF_Sales_Ratio -0.000268 -8.30e-05 -0.000262 -7.82e-05 -0.000231 -8.10e-05
(0.000170) (0.000111) (0.000174) (0.000109) (0.000173) (0.000110)
Constant -0.333 -0.153 -0.306 -0.275 -0.357 -0.308
(0.669) (0.436) (0.695) (0.434) (0.691) (0.436)
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.294 0.182 0.252 0.208 0.269 0.207
R-squared adjusted 0.204 0.072 0.157 0.102 0.175 0.100
Source: Own Calculation
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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fundamentally different than firms with 26% family owner-
ship. Nevertheless, I further tested the impact of the presence
of a family CEO using dummy variables (see Appendix 3 for
the regression table). However, the results reveal that neither
the presence of a family CEO nor the presence of an external
CEO has a significant impact on performance during the GFC
in any of the three models.
More interestingly, I also tested the impact on ownership
defined with the help of dummy variables on firm perfor-
mance using alternative measures of firm performance (see
Appendix 4 for regression table). Whereas LFF ownership
is not significant in any of the models including ROA, ROIC,
and s q as a performance measure, TFF ownership is signifi-
cant when measuring performance with ROA across all three
thresholds. The positive coefficient indicates that TFF owner-
ship positively affects the firm’s ROA, regardless whether TFF
are defined using a threshold of 50% (p < 0.1,β = 8.378),
30% (p < 0.1,β = 7.717), or 25% (p < 0.1,β = 8.008).
TFF ownership computed with a dummy variable is not sig-
nificant when performance is measured by ROIC or Tobin’s
q.
4.3.3. Alternative Crisis Window
In their study of 2,949 firms across 27 European countries,
Van Essen et al. (2015) argued that the crisis period should
include the beginnings of the real estate bubble in the US and
therefore determined the period to be analyzed from 2007
to 2009. Following the original approach with accumulated
total shareholder return as the performance measure and the
percentage of voting rights held by the family or founders as
a continuous, independent variable, I repeat my analysis us-
ing an alternative crisis window covering the period January
1, 2007, until December 31, 2009. The results are compared
against the original analysis where shareholder returns were
accumulated over the period starting September 14, 2008,
until March 6, 2009
Table 13 shows the regression results. The first model
shows the impact of the seven different ownership types
while the second model further differentiates between TFF
with a family CEO and TFF with an external CEO. The regres-
sion results of the models are very similar. TFF ownership is
not significant neither during the original crisis window nor
during the alternative crisis window. LFF ownership, in con-
trast, is significant in both approaches. The positive coeffi-
cient indicates that LFF ownership is associated with a higher
firm performance from September 14, 2008, until March 6,
2009 (p < 0.1,β = 0.403) as well as in the period January
1, 2007, until December 31, 2009 (p < 0.1,β = 0.631).
Differentiating between TFF with family CEOs and TFF
with external CEOs does not lead to any significant results,
regardless of the period used in the analysis. Interestingly,
the significance level of LFF ownership in the regression using
the original period is higher (p < 0.05,β = 0.440) than when
using the alternative crisis window (p < 0.1,β = 0.652).
Overall, the R-squared and R-squared adjusted in both mod-
els are lower when examining the ownership performance
relationship during an alternative time period. To conclude,
the results suggest that the findings are robust to the alterna-
tive crisis period definition and the model using the original
definition of the GFC timeframe shows a higher fit.
4.3.4. Alternative Analytical Approach
Several researchers provided evidence suggesting that the
relationship between family ownership and firm performance
might not be linear. Specifically, some scholars found that
the relationship can be best described by an inverted U-shape
(e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Kowalewski et al., 2010; Van
Essen et al., 2013). More recently, also Maseda et al. (2019)
found that there seems to be an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between family board members’ ownership and firm per-
formance. I therefore analyzed the impact of TFF and LFF
ownership on accumulated total shareholder return during
the GFC using an alternative, non-linear regression model.
Table 14 shows the results of a quadratic regression. The
quadratic regression fits a non-linear model to the data al-
though some consider it to be a special case of linear multiple
regression because it is linear as a statistical estimation prob-
lem. Specifically, the following formula depicts the quadratic
regression analysis:
yiβ0 + β1X iβ2X2i + · · ·+ β1Xn + β2X 2n+ εi
Where
yi = Dependent variable
β0 = Population Y intercept
β1 · · ·βn = Population slope coefficients
X i · · ·Xn = Independent variables and control variables
εi = Random error term
Model 1 again shows the regression results of firm perfor-
mance during the GFC for the different ownership types
whereas model 2 further differentiates between family CEOs
and external CEOs. While a significant t-test of the quadratic
term might indicate a quadratic relationship, considering
the significance level of a quadratic term is not sufficient to
interpret the results. I therefore performed a joint test of the
linear and quadratic coefficients of the independent variables
(Table 15). The p-values in both models are always greater
than 0.1 except for the ownership type state. However, in
that case, a quadratic distribution cannot be assumed since
the effect of the quadratic coefficient is not significant.
Overall, the results do not suggest that the relationship be-
tween firm performance and accumulated total shareholder
return during the GFC is quadratic. Therefore, the conjec-
ture of researchers finding a U-shape or inverted U-shape
relationship between ownership and performance cannot be
supported.
4.4. Further Empirical Analyses
In the light of the inconclusive regression results, I con-
ducted further, additional empirical analyses to better under-
stand the behaviors of family and non-family firms during
the GFC that consequentially might evoke performance dif-
ferences when compared to other firms. Following other re-
searchers that examined the behavior of TFF and LFF during
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Table 13: Robustness – Regression including Alternative Crisis Window
DV: Total shareholder return (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)







LFF 0.403* 0.631* 0.440** 0.652*
(0.208) (0.339) (0.210) (0.340)
Other_Individual 0.639* -0.265 0.633* -0.254
(0.349) (0.566) (0.350) (0.567)
Financial_Institution 0.0948 -0.00929 0.124 -0.00619
(0.151) (0.249) (0.153) (0.249)
PE 0.176 -0.606 0.194 -0.576
(0.249) (0.404) (0.250) (0.405)
State 1.306*** 0.472 1.313*** 0.459
(0.400) (0.648) (0.400) (0.648)
Other 0.0241 -0.259 0.0141 -0.266
(0.129) (0.210) (0.130) (0.210)
Pre_Crisis_Return -0.0237 -0.0525 -0.0302
(0.0809) (0.0501) (0.0812)
group(SIC) = 2 -0.358 -0.0103 -0.277 0.0774
(0.391) (0.634) (0.396) (0.641)
group(SIC) = 3 -0.399 -0.712 -0.331 -0.629
(0.369) (0.597) (0.373) (0.604)
group(SIC) = 4 -0.496 -0.814 -0.415 -0.720
(0.365) (0.590) (0.370) (0.599)
group(SIC) = 5 -0.693* -0.965 -0.624 -0.878
(0.384) (0.622) (0.388) (0.629)
group(SIC) = 6 -0.335 -0.668 -0.277 -0.603
(0.380) (0.616) (0.383) (0.620)
group(SIC) = 7 -0.444 -0.847 -0.328 -0.746
(0.393) (0.640) (0.401) (0.649)
group(SIC) = 8 -0.207 -0.558 -0.123 -0.472
(0.370) (0.599) (0.374) (0.607)
group(SIC) = 9 -0.132 -0.758 -0.0601 -0.668
(0.388) (0.628) (0.392) (0.635)
ln_IPO 0.0471 -0.0746 0.0429 -0.0772
(0.0577) (0.0934) (0.0577) (0.0935)
ln_Cap 0.00281 0.0308 0.00831 0.0350
(0.0170) (0.0279) (0.0174) (0.0283)
DE_Ratio -0.000305* -0.000569* -0.000321* -0.000577*
(0.000184) (0.000298) (0.000184) (0.000298)
Current_Ratio 0.00797 -0.000362 0.0103* 0.000138
(0.00531) (0.00922) (0.00570) (0.00924)
CF_Sales_Ratio -4.93e-05 -9.36e-06 -6.27e-05 -1.16e-05
(0.000106) (0.000173) (0.000107) (0.000173)
Constant -0.306 0.751 -0.423 0.616
(0.430) (0.697) (0.440) (0.712)
Observations 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.230 0.173 0.240 0.177
R-squared adjusted 0.131 0.061 0.132 0.061
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Table 14: Robustness – Quadratic Regression






































group(SIC) = 2 -0.297 -0.265
(0.401) (0.408)
group(SIC) = 3 -0.354 -0.339
(0.379) (0.387)
group(SIC) = 4 -0.472 -0.437
(0.373) (0.381)
group(SIC) = 5 -0.634 -0.593
(0.395) (0.402)
group(SIC) = 6 -0.292 -0.283
(0.390) (0.395)
group(SIC) = 7 -0.400 -0.366
(0.402) (0.411)
(Continued)
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Table 14—continued
group(SIC) = 8 -0.177 -0.153
(0.378) (0.385)
















R-squared adjusted 0.111 0.115
Source: Own Calculatio
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15: Joint F-test of the Linear and Quadratic Coefficients
Variables tested F-Statistic F P-Value
(2,150)







Model 2 Family CEO 1.39 0.2522








severe crises (e.g. Lins et al., 2013; Van Essen et al., 2015),
I analyzed the firms’ decisions with regard to their person-
nel, capital structure, and investments. It should be noted
that at this point there will be no comprehensive hypothesis
development, but results are presented rather shortly, giving
additional information with regard to the decision making
of TFF and LFF during the GFC and therefore might provide
possible areas for future analyses outside the scope of this
thesis.
Studying 2,949 companies across 27 European countries,
Van Essen et al. (2015) found that TFF show a lower propen-
sity to cut wages or downsize their workforce in both crisis
and pre-crisis conditions. They argued that TFF more likely
consider the interests of their employees and are under less
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pressure from outside investors to cut wages or decrease
workforce. Analogous to Van Essen et al. (2015), I analyzed
personnel-related alterations of German TFF and LFF dur-
ing the GFC. Specifically, I examined both changes in the
workforce and in salaries. ∆ Workforce is a dependent vari-
able calculated as the percentage change of the workforce
between 2007 and 2009. Workforce is the reported number
of both full and part-time employees of the company. ∆
Salaries represents the percentage change in wages paid to
the employees by the firm. It includes but is not restricted
to salaries, employee benefits such as health insurance, and
contributions to pension plans.
Table 16 shows the variable descriptions. Despite the cri-
sis, on average both the number of employees (+7.3%) as
well as the amount of salaries paid (+13.9%) increased.
While the 25th percentile shows that some firms decreased
workforce (-5.8%) and wages (-3.0%), the positive me-
dian indicates that at least half of the firms showed positive
growth rates in both number of employees and salaries and
benefits paid to them. Overall, the standard deviation is
rather low, and the mean is in between the median and the
75th percentile for both variables. It should be noted that
the change in salaries paid to the workforce is partly caused
by the change in the workforce.
The regression results are presented in Table 17. The im-
pact of ownership on the change in workforce and salary
payments is tested in models 1a and 1b respectively. In
the model, that is analogous to the main regression but
with a different dependent variable, neither TFF nor LFF
are significant with regard to the employee-related deci-
sions. Moreover, no other ownership type seems to be
significantly associated with a change in the number of
workforce or the amount of salaries paid to the employ-
ees. Interestingly, past performance is the variable with the
highest significance. A high total shareholder return over the
years 2005 and 2006 is positively associated with workforce
change (p < 0.01,β = 0.084) and salary payment change
(p < 0.01,β = 0.124). Furthermore, age since IPO is neg-
atively associated with workforce (p < 0.05,β = −0.0798)
and salary change (p < 0.1,β = −0.078).
Next, financing decisions with regard to the borrowing
of capital shall be analyzed. Lins et al. (2013) assumed
different propensities of TFF with regard to cash financing
decisions but could not find significant results. Nevertheless,
I performed an analysis of financing decisions within the
frame of German listed firms. Table 16 shows the character-
istics of the variables ∆ Long-Term Debt and ∆ Short-Term
Debt. Specifically, ∆ Long-Term Debt is the change of the
firm’s long-term debt between the years 2007 and 2009.
Long-term debt comprises all interest-bearing financial obli-
gations, excluding amounts due within one year. It is shown
net of premium or discount. While the median firm did not
increase or decrease its long-term debt (+/- 0.0), the very
high mean (+828.6%) shows that very few firms increased
their debt excessively. This is also reflected in the high stan-
dard deviation. The variable ∆ Short-Term Debt shows a
similar and even more pronounced statistic: The median
firm did not increase or decrease its short-term debt (+/-
0.0), but the average firm increased its short-term debt sig-
nificantly (+1919.7%). The rather modest increase of the
75th percentile (+54.3%) shows that again very few firms in-
creased their short-term debt quite significantly. Short-term
debt represents that portion of debt payable within one year
including current portion of long-term debt and sinking fund
requirements of preferred stock.
The change in capital structure is represented in models
2a and 2b in the regression table. Similarly to the results
regarding the firms’ workforce, neither TFF nor LFF owner-
ship is significant. Furthermore, other ownership structures
do not show significant results with the except of state own-
ership, which is significantly associated with long-term debt
(p < 0.1,β = −187.4). The negative coefficient implies that
with increasing state ownership, firms are less likely to ex-
hibit strong borrowing of long-term capital during the GFC
when compared with other firms. Furthermore, a higher cur-
rent ratio is positively associated with an increase in short-
term debt (p < 0.01,β = 8.769).
Finally, also the investment decisions of TFF and LFF will
be analyzed. Lins et al. (2013) found that TFF cut invest-
ments more than other firms. They argued, that for TFF the
survival of the family’s wealth is of major importance and
therefore owning families extract capital at the expense of
prospective investment projects of the firm. Specifically, I an-
alyze the change in the capital expenditure to total asset ratio
from 2007 to 2009. Capital expenditures represent the funds
used to purchase fixed assets with the except of acquisitions.
It includes but is not restricted to investments in property,
plant, and equipment. The amount of capital expenditures
is then divided by the total assets of the firm. By using ra-
tios, the comparability between firms is increased. Table 16
shows that ∆ Capex-Asset-Ratio on average increased signif-
icantly between 2007 and 2009 (+475.9%). However, the
median change is negative (-22.9%) suggesting that at least
half of the firms in the sample decreased their capex-to-asset
ratio. The fact that the mean is well above the 75th percentile
(+11.6%) again is an indication that few firms increased their
capital expenditure-to-asset ratio quite extensively during the
GFC.
The regression results again do not reveal a significant ef-
fect of TFF or LFF ownership in model 3. With regard to
other ownership types, only financial institution ownership
is significant (p < 0.05,β = 21.16). The positive coefficient
implies that higher ownership of financial institutions results
in a stronger increase in the capex-to-asset ratio. The high R-
squared (0.878) and R-squared adjusted (0.861), indicating
a good model fit, is quite notable. For completeness, the anal-
ysis again is repeated in Appendix 5 differentiating between
family CEOs and non-family CEOs. However, the differenti-
ation does not lead to any significant effect other than those
presented in the previous paragraphs.
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Table 16: Further Analyses - Variable Descriptions
Variable N Mean 25th pcl. Median 75th pcl. SD
∆ Workforce 178 7.3% -5.8% 4.8% 15.5% 0.24
∆ Salaries 178 13.9% -3.0% 8.7% 22.8% 0.30
∆ Long-Term Debt 178 828.6% -20.0% 0.0% 51.9% 87.97
∆ Short-Term Debt 178 1919.7% -44.0% 0.0% 54.3% 187.14
∆ Capex-Asset-Ratio 178 475.9% -57.5% -22.9% 11.6% 58.06
Source: Own Calculation
5. Discussion
Analyzing German publicly listed firms during the GFC as
a unique exogenous contingency, the aim of this study was to
better understand the frequently assumed supremacy of TFF
and LFF over other ownership types (e.g. Allouche et al.,
2008; Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Chrisman et al., 2007; Maseda
et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2011).
In this section, the results of my study will be interpreted
with regard to the hypotheses derived as well as with ref-
erence to extant academic literature. Thereafter, theoretical
and practical implications of the findings will be discussed.
Finally, limitations of this study as well as fruitful avenues
for future research will be outlined.
5.1. Interpretation of Results
In my first hypothesis (1a), I expected TFF ownership to
be associated with higher firm performance during the GFC,
analogous to findings of previous research covering sam-
ple firms located in other jurisdictions (Amann & Jaussaud,
2012; Minichilli et al., 2016; Saleh et al., 2017; Van Essen et
al., 2015). I argued that TFF might reduce their emphasis on
SEW objectives for the benefit of financial performance and
even inject private capital, provide financing through other
family firms, and have easier access to debt, all of which
increases the performance of the firm. The results provide
only weak support for hypothesis 1a: There is no significant
effect in the main regression model. However, TFF owner-
ship results in superior performance when firm performance
is measured with the accounting measure ROA and when
TFF ownership is constructed as a dummy variable with a
threshold of 25% voting rights that have to be possessed by
the owning family.
Interestingly, the results reveal an even stronger positive ef-
fect on firm performance during the pre-crisis period 2005
– 2007. TFF ownership is significantly and positively associ-
ated with accumulated total shareholder return in the main
regression analysis but is also significant when measuring
firm performance with ROA, ROIC, or Tobin’s q. These re-
sults suggest that there seems to be a general tendency of
outperformance of TFF ownership during stable economic
conditions. Therefore, the findings are similar to those of
other researchers who argued that TFF generally show higher
firm performance when compared to other ownership types
(e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Block et al., 2011; Miller et al.,
2011). The positive performance effect of TFF, according to
academic literature, most probably originates from reduced
conflicts between ownership and management (agency the-
ory), the commitment to lead the firm in a collectivistic way
(stewardship theory), unique strategic resources (RBV), as
well as the benefit from long-term orientation and unique
values and norms of the family (concept of SEW).
With regard to LFF, I hypothesized that also LFF ownership
led to higher firm performance during the GFC (hypothesis
1b), because LFF are free from kinship ties and therefore can
make strategic decisions faster and more efficiently during
times of financial distress. Furthermore, LFF are less likely
subject to owner-manager conflicts or conflicts among own-
ers such as in TFF, where disputes between family members
might arise. The performance of LFF during the GFC has
scarcely been examined in prior academic research, only
Zhou et al. (2012) published a study in a renown academic
journal and derived the same hypothesis. For the greater
part, the results provide support for hypothesis 1b: LFF
ownership is significant in the main regression, thereby indi-
cating that accumulated total shareholder return during the
GFC was higher when compared to other ownership types.
The results are significant when determining LFF status with
the help of dummy variables that were one if the founders
held 25% or 30%, respectively. Only when measuring per-
formance with alternative accounting measures and mixed
accounting and financial market measures, LFF ownership is
not significant.
In contrast to the impact of TFF ownership, the positive
effect of LFF ownership on firm performance was almost
exclusively during the crisis period. Only in one specific
case, where LFF status was determined using a 50% voting
rights dummy, LFF ownership is significant and has a posi-
tive effect on firm performance. In the main regression and
all other robustness tests, LFF ownership is not significant.
Therefore, the general notion suggesting that LFF ownership
always influences firm performance positively due to their
social context emphasizing financial performance, expertise
and skills as well as independence from family disputes and
other SEW objectives could not be supported. While other
researchers found supremacy of LFF in general during stable
economic conditions (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini
& Caprio, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006),
this study does not provide similar evidence with regard to
publicly listed firms in Germany but emphasizes the impor-
tance of a differentiated perspective incorporating the GFC
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Table 17: Further Analyses – Regression Results
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ Workforce ∆ Salaries ∆ Long-Term ∆ Short-Term ∆ Capex-Asset
Debt Debt Ratio
TFF -0.0256 -0.0209 1.156 -58.43 5.597
(0.0714) (0.0898) (27.69) (57.88) (6.866)
LFF 0.0875 -0.0371 13.58 16.41 -17.96
(0.133) (0.167) (51.48) (107.6) (12.76)
Other_Individual -0.0117 0.177 -56.74 25.30 25.17
(0.221) (0.278) (85.91) (179.5) (21.30)
Financial_Institution -0.0972 -0.134 59.54 -52.09 21.16**
(0.0972) (0.122) (37.70) (78.79) (9.347)
PE -0.00695 -0.0828 88.44 -38.33 22.71
(0.158) (0.199) (61.25) (128.0) (15.19)
State -0.320 -0.416 -187.4* 51.13 -6.655
(0.253) (0.318) (98.25) (205.3) (24.36)
Other -0.00211 0.0602 29.95 -11.30 1.858
(0.0820) (0.103) (31.82) (66.49) (7.888)
Pre_Crisis_Return 0.0840*** 0.124*** -8.369 -29.69 0.847
(0.0316) (0.0398) (12.27) (25.65) (3.043)
group(SIC) = 2 -0.0184 0.0326 -2.753 -9.835 10.92
(0.248) (0.312) (96.17) (201.0) (23.84)
group(SIC) = 3 -0.229 -0.253 -2.639 -8.112 5.823
(0.234) (0.294) (90.59) (189.3) (22.46)
group(SIC) = 4 -0.247 -0.244 1.480 -12.26 5.416
(0.231) (0.290) (89.58) (187.2) (22.21)
group(SIC) = 5 -0.259 -0.213 116.7 -45.49 21.09
(0.243) (0.306) (94.31) (197.1) (23.38)
group(SIC) = 6 -0.260 -0.315 6.395 227.0 -6.326
(0.241) (0.303) (93.41) (195.2) (23.16)
group(SIC) = 7 -0.252 -0.182 -7.951 -2.402 -16.00
(0.250) (0.315) (97.10) (202.9) (24.08)
group(SIC) = 8 -0.0883 -0.0628 -1.501 -17.41 16.98
(0.234) (0.295) (90.94) (190.1) (22.55)
group(SIC) = 9 -0.181 -0.144 -4.397 -32.78 0.417
(0.245) (0.309) (95.20) (199.0) (23.60)
ln_IPO -0.0798** -0.0781* -8.133 -10.60 2.289
(0.0365) (0.0459) (14.17) (29.62) (3.514)
ln_Cap 0.00972 0.00577 0.692 -2.563 1.965*
(0.0109) (0.0137) (4.235) (8.850) (1.050)
DE_Ratio -0.000101 1.09e-05 -0.0454 -0.00529 0.00501
(0.000117) (0.000147) (0.0452) (0.0945) (0.0112)
Current_Ratio -0.00490 -0.000577 -1.630 8.769*** 9.687***
(0.00361) (0.00453) (1.399) (2.924) (0.347)
CF_Sales_Ratio 1.58e-05 6.15e-05 -0.00894 0.0295 0.0363***
(6.77e-05) (8.52e-05) (0.0263) (0.0549) (0.00651)
Constant 0.316 0.375 12.73 95.45 -64.83**
(0.273) (0.343) (105.8) (221.1) (26.22)
Observations 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.229 0.213 0.134 0.164 0.878
R-squared adjusted 0.125 0.107 0.018 0.052 0.861
Source: Own Calculation
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
T. Wenig / Junior Management Science 6(2) (2021) 237-278272
as a contingent event into the analysis.
In a third analysis, I differentiated further between TFF
where a family member holds the CEO position and TFF
where an external, outside CEO manages the firm. I ex-
pected that having a family CEO unfolds as disadvantageous
during the GFC because the managers might extract capital
out of the firm and thus ensure the survival of the family’s
wealth. Therefore, analogous to Minichilli et al. (2016), I
assumed firm performance to be lower. The results, how-
ever, do not support hypothesis 2: The presence of a family
CEO is not significant in any of the regression models during
the GFC. Thus, there is no indication that firm performance
during the crisis was influenced positively or negatively by
the involvement of the family in the firm. Similarly, the in-
teraction term representing an external CEO in TFF is not
significant in any of the models except when performance
is measured with ROA, where the presence of an outside
manager has a weak but positive effect on firm performance
during the crisis.
However, the results indicate that during the period of
stable economic conditions, the presence of a family CEO
significantly impacted firm performance positively: Family
CEO presence is significant in the main regression as well
as when using alternative performance measures ROA and
ROIC. The results thereby are aligned with evidence sug-
gested by other researchers (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Andres, 2008; Chu, 2011; Kowalewski et al., 2010; Minichilli
et al., 2010) who argued that family CEOs contribute to the
superior performance of TFF due to the alignment of interests
between management and owners, the CEOs’ behavior as a
steward of the organization, the CEOs’ specific knowledge
and skills, or their emotional attachment and transgenera-
tional intention.
To summarize, the results indicate a general superior per-
formance of TFF ownership over other ownership types that
is more pronounced during overall stable economic con-
ditions and generally is not magnified during situations of
financial distress such as the GFC. LFF ownership, in contrast,
does not exhibit superior effects during the steady-state pe-
riod but seems to be beneficial in times where firms face
serious threats due to macroeconomic developments. Ana-
lyzing family management led to results suggesting a reverse
effect: While beneficiary during stable economic conditions,
the competitive advantage from a family CEO seemed to
vanish during the GFC.
5.2. Implications for Theory
I contribute to the family business literature by analyzing
theoretically and empirically the performance of German
publicly listed firms during and prior to the GFC. Specifically,
my study has a number of potential theoretical implications.
First, I contribute to the longstanding and inconclusive dis-
cussion of whether family firms exhibit superior firm per-
formance compared to their non-family counterparts (Block
et al., 2011). Maseda et al. (2019) argued that the effects
of corporate ownership and governance on firm behavior
were “some of the most debated issues in business and man-
agement literature” (p. 285). Although significance levels
varied across models the family ownership variables TFF and
LFF were only significant in some of the models, each of the
significant coefficients had a positive sign. This indicates a
general tendency of the superior performance of family own-
ership irrespective of performance measurement or variable
definitions in the model. For other ownership structures,
in contrast, the results did not provide sufficient evidence
suggesting a significant and robust impact of ownership on
firm performance. Adopting a purely agency-theoretical per-
spective, one could argue that the benefit of concentrated
ownership and management through, for instance, reduced
principal-agency conflicts exceed the costs often associated
with such ownership structures, in particular the extraction
of resources for the benefit of the family shareholders and on
the expense of other investors. It remains questionable, how-
ever, whether the well-adopted agency theory is sufficient to
explain the superior performance. The literature review de-
lineated further academic theories and concepts such as the
stewardship theory, RBV, and the concept of SEW. While it is
very difficult to attribute the financial market and accounting
based outcome of an organization to a specific component of
these academic theories and concepts, this study in general
supports the notion that the outlined mechanisms collec-
tively result in superior performance and outweigh potential
disadvantages of TFF or LFF.
Second, I contribute to the narrative of an external hazard
as a contingency that moderates the impact of ownership
on firm performance by analyzing the sample firms during
and prior to the GFC. The implications of my study, however,
are twofold. On the one hand, I could not establish that
TFF ownership resulted in exceptional superior or inferior
performance during the GFC when compared to a period
of stable economic conditions prior to the GFC. Scholars,
in contrast, suggested that with increasing external hazard,
the balance between families’ non-economic and economic
objectives during stable economic conditions (Berrone et
al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) is challenged and fam-
ily shareholders prioritize the financial survival of the TFF,
thereby showing an explorative attitude characterized by en-
hanced risk-taking and ultimately higher firm performance
(Minichilli et al., 2016). This study rather suggests that
TFF are significantly different from other firms and exhibit
higher performance during steady-state periods but during
crisis suffer similarly to other firms and cannot capitalize on
the advantages originating from TFF-specific characteristics
during such times of financial distress. Moreover, it should
be noted that the further empirical analyses conducted in
section 4.4 support this proposition: Analyzing employee-
related as well as financing and investment decisions, this
study does not provide any significant indication that TFF
have behaved differently during the GFC than firms with
other ownership structures.
On the other hand, the GFC indeed seems to be a contin-
gency that moderates the impact of LFF ownership on firm
performance. This result is of special interest as LFF owner-
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ship and its association with firm performance during times
of financial distress has been subject in academic literature
only to a very limited degree. Accordingly, extant literature
does not provide a comprehensive overview of underlying
theories explaining the superior performance of LFF owner-
ship during crisis. From an agency-theoretical perspective,
LFF are very similar to TFF in that regard that ownership
and management are often concentrated. However, the dif-
ferences among these two ownership types may lie in the fact
that principal-principal conflicts might arise more frequently
in TFF where several family members are shareholders of
the firm while in LFF there is mostly one founder or a very
low number of founders holding voting rights in the firm
and hence the company is less apt to such conflicts. From
a SEW perspective, it might be the independence from non-
economic obligations and higher perceived freedom to take
risks and fully concentrate on the performance of the firm
that helps LFF to outperform other companies during the
GFC. To summarize, the narrative of an exogenous shock
serving as a natural experiment that moves firms out of their
equilibrium and hence magnifies costs and benefits of own-
ership structures can only partially be supported.
The third contribution is to the increasingly debated topic
of heterogeneity among family firms (e.g. Berrone et al.,
2012). I considered three different dimensions of hetero-
geneity in my analysis. Firstly, by differentiating between
TFF and LFF ownership, I considered the generational stage
of the family firms, and the results confirm that the two
ownership types affect firm performance differently. Espe-
cially the social context of founders and the existence of
non-economic utility that is increasingly important in multi-
generational TFF result in different corporate decision mak-
ing. Differentiating between the two ownership structures
helps to disentangle how the different academic theories
influence the behavior of the heterogenetic family business
landscape and has been gained high attraction in literature
(e.g. Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Miller et al., 2007).
Furthermore, regarding heterogeneity, I considered the
magnitude of ownership, thus the stake held by the family
or founder, by defining ownership as a continuous variable
and testing also a non-linear regression model. Because the
significance of variables and the corresponding coefficients
differ, it can be assumed that the magnitude of ownership
indeed is an important factor to consider when examining
family firms. Furthermore, I tested different dummy vari-
ables representing various equity stakes held by the family
or founders. It is reasonable to assume that the outlined
mechanisms and their respective academic theories are im-
pacting firm performance differently depending on the stake
of ownership. For instance, I would expect that the desire
to preserve the SEW might be present even with low family
ownership and increases rather moderately with larger own-
ership stakes. The elements of agency theory, however, are
heavily dependent on the level of ownership. A family with
many voting rights can use its powerful blockholder position
whereas a family in a minority shareholder position cannot
and moreover might be more prone to other governance
issues such as owner-manager conflicts. These conclusions
are in line with family business researchers who argued that
the ownership-performance relationship is not linear but de-
pendent on the degree of ownership (e.g. Anderson & Reeb,
2003; Kowalewski et al., 2010; Maseda et al., 2019).
Moreover, family involvement through board membership
is another dimension of heterogeneity considered in this
study. Although not pronounced during the GFC, this study
showed that there is a positive impact of strategic leaders
belonging to the family that enhances firm performance.
The role of a family CEO has been extensively discussed in
academic literature and scholars argued that although the
family managers might tend to abuse their situation and pur-
sue family-related goals on the expense of firm performance,
the advantageousness of having a family CEO outweighs the
costs (e.g. Andres, 2008; Kowalewski et al., 2010). Again,
it is difficult to determine how exactly family management
affects firm performance but, considering different academic
theories the positive effect might be due to a family CEO
who has fewer incentives to act opportunistically (agency
theory), or sometimes even maximizes his own utility by see-
ing the firm strive (stewardship theory), while capitalizing
on specific skills and knowledge (RBV), and being attached
emotionally to the organization with the intention to pre-
serve it over a long period of time and potentially hand it
over to the next generation (concept of SEW).
The fourth contribution of this study is the validity of the
SEW as an appropriate perspective to better understand the
behavior of families and founders. The previous paragraphs
already indicated that the concept of SEW plays a pivotal
role in understanding why TFF or LFF ownership is different
from other ownership types. The SEW perspective is based
on behavioral agency theory and obtained its name within
the frame of a study of Spanish oil mills by Gómez-Mejía et
al. (2007). It has gained increasing attraction in recent fam-
ily business research (Minichilli et al., 2016). The evidence
suggested in this study reconnects with the recent advance-
ment of the SEW concept distinguishing between restricted
and extended SEW priorities. While restricted SEW priorities
are family-centric and often counteract the interests of non-
family stakeholders in the long run, extended SEW priorities
go beyond the family and are characterized as advocating
stewardship, sustainability, or multi-stakeholder advance-
ment (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). For instance, while
the extended SEW approach might help to better understand
the superior performance of TFF with family management,
the differentiation shows that the argumentation substantiat-
ing the superior performance of LFF refers to the absence of
restricted SEW priorities. In short, the objectives relating to
the SEW have been further divided in order to better under-
stand the mechanisms that lead to different firm behaviors.
To summarize, the conjecture that ownership structures
affect firm performance in particular during financial crises,
magnifying ownership-specific costs and benefits, cannot be
supported unanimously. On the one hand, this study con-
tributes to one of the most debated issues in family busi-
ness research as the results indicate a general superior per-
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formance of TFF during periods of stable economic activity.
On the other hand, the macroeconomic environment of a firm
seems to matter in case of LFF ownership as these firms show
superior performance compared to other firms during crises
but do not stand out from the sample in a period of stable
economic conditions prior to the GFC. The diverging results
confirm the need of a differentiated perspective regarding the
heterogeneous landscape of family firms and, finally, differ-
ent dimensions of the SEW concept have been found helpful
to understand the underlying mechanisms impacting firm be-
havior, further promoting the concept on its way to becoming
an established academic theory.
5.3. Implications for Practice
This study examining the performance of firms with differ-
ent ownership types during and prior to the GFC offers sev-
eral practical implications. First, investors and bondholders
gain a deeper understanding of how ownership structures af-
fect firm performance. Generally, investors can assume that
TFF tend to have higher returns when compared to other
firms and therefore investors could concentrate their invest-
ment on firms with family shareholders. The supposition
that the positive effect on firm performance is even mag-
nified when a family member holds the top management
position of the firm could also be considered in their invest-
ment decision. During periods of economic downturns, such
as the GFC, having invested in TFF does not turn out to be
unsuccessful but the empirical results showed that in these
times LFF ownership is more likely to be beneficial for firm
performance and should therefore be in the focus of equity
investing.
Second, financial institutions and rating agencies can in-
corporate the findings into the credit risk assessment of TFF
and LFF. While TFF ownership, contrary to the belief of some
researchers arguing that the family shareholders harm the
firm by extracting resources (e.g. Anderson et al., 2009),
does not exhibit any negative performance effect during the
crisis, it proved even beneficial in general, during stable
economic conditions, and TFF could therefore be consid-
ered as more creditworthy than firms with other shareholder
types. In addition, financial institutions and rating agencies
should value the long-term orientation (Anderson & Reeb,
2003), aversion with regard to their bankruptcy risk (Poletti-
Hughes & Williams, 2017), and willingness to inject private
capital to the firm in times of financial distress (Villalonga &
Amit, 2010). With regard to LFF, although granting credits
to the relatively young firms during economic downturns
might impose risks, financial institutions and rating agencies
should consider that these firms tend to outperform other
organizations in particular during crises, and banks or other
institutions therefore can adjust their credit risk assessment
accordingly.
Third, members of the shareholding family gain a deeper
understanding of the advantageousness of having a family
CEO, especially during periods of stable economic conditions.
Families should meet calls for widely diffused, outsider-
dominated governance systems (Minichilli et al., 2016) with
caution and acknowledge that the unique skill set, emotional
attachment, and attitude as the steward of the organization
might evolve to higher firm performance and to a sustained
competitive advantage in the long term. However, no con-
clusion can be drawn that having a family member as CEO
during a global recession turns out to be beneficial for the
firm.
Finally, policymakers could recognize the strengths and
performance superiority of TFF and LFF and their contribu-
tion to the national economy. Although it should be argued
with caution if policymakers shall privilege particular own-
ership structures over others, it might be beneficial for the
economy to support the development of TFF and LFF, for
instance by creating awareness about the importance of such
ownership structures in the corporate environment. Further-
more, the development of LFF could be supported especially
during crises to even further foster the positive effect on per-
formance, offsetting partially the negative effect of a global
recession.
5.4. Limitations
This study has some important limitations. First, the firms
of my sample were all listed in the German Prime Standard.
Therefore, the findings might not be transferable or only
partially transferable to a very small or mid-sized German
family firm. Among my sample firms are some of the largest
corporations in Germany and due to their legal form, they
have to follow rules and laws that might restrict family in-
fluence and involvement when compared with smaller firms.
For example, a listed legal entity (“AG”) is required to have a
supervisory board partly consisting of employee representa-
tives (§96AktG). The mere size of these companies implies a
corresponding organizational behavior typical for large firms
that due to the complexity limits the influence of individual
shareholders. However, it should be noted that an empiri-
cal study of smaller firms and their behavior is very difficult
to perform as smaller firms do not have to comply to pub-
lication and disclosure requirements to the same extent as
large firms do. For this reason, most of the studies analyzed
in the theoretical background section of this thesis exam-
ined performance of publicly listed family and non-family
firms (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Bjuggren
& Palmberg, 2010; Bonilla et al., 2010; Kowalewski et al.,
2010; Martínez et al., 2007; Sacristan-Navarro et al., 2011a,
2011b).
Second, it should be noted that the German market an-
alyzed in my study includes a high number of TFF (Fiss
& Zajac, 2004) and is often characterized as an economy
heavily dependent of family firms, which is why compara-
bility among geographies and the transferability of results
for example to Anglo-Saxon countries might be limited. Fur-
thermore, regulatory peculiarities of the German jurisdiction
such as the employees’ rights of participation in the super-
visory board mentioned in the previous paragraph might
distort results and limit the transferability of findings to
firms in other jurisdictions
Third, family involvement in the management in this study
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is determined only by the presence of a CEO who at the
same time is a member of the owning family. Although
this approach might be appropriate as the CEO is the single
most important and influential person in the organization
(Minichilli et al., 2010), the owning family might influence
the management of the firm in other forms (Berrone et al.,
2012). For instance, family members might exert pressure
over the management of the firms through other positions in
the company such as board memberships or division man-
agement positions. Furthermore, the family influence might
be manifested in the membership or even chairmanship of
the supervisory board, overseeing management actions and
appointing the board members running the organization.
5.5. Avenues for Future Research
The analysis that has been conducted throughout this the-
sis provides several avenues for future research. First, studies
should be performed also for small and medium-sized firms
in order to decrease the effect of large firm size on corporate
behavior as mentioned earlier. Because it might be difficult
to collect data for empirical analyses, it could be revealing to
choose a qualitative research approach. In general, the ben-
efit of a qualitative analysis is that it provides deeper insights
into the underlying mechanisms and drivers of firm perfor-
mance with regard to the different ownership types. Thereby,
it would complement and enhance the existing quantitative
research.
Second, researchers should consider similar studies with
firms in a different geographical or organizational context.
For instance, companies in Anglo-Saxon countries might be-
have differently than companies in the German market that is
especially characterized by the influence families have on the
business. In order to increase the explanatory power of find-
ings that might be distorted by the peculiarities of national
jurisdictions, future research should consider extending the
results to cross-national evidence.
Third, further research on heterogeneity among the owner-
ship structure, management structure, as well as the gen-
erational stage of family firms should be intensified. Espe-
cially in the context of the longstanding debate whether fam-
ily firms perform better than other firms, the differentiation
of TFFs and LFFs has been incorporated in only few studies
before. However, after finding partial support for my first
set of hypotheses, I believe that it is important to make this
distinction because these different types of ownership struc-
tures tend to elicit distinct organizational behavior as the im-
pact on firm performance was found to be different. Besides
the integration of heterogeneity aspects with regard to the
ownership structure, further research on the involvement of
family members and founders not only as CEO but also as
board members or supervisory board members could help
identify how families and founders influence the strategic de-
cision making process in an organization, therefore covering
a broader spectrum of family involvement.
Finally, future research on the validity of using an eco-
nomic shock as an experiment, where firms are moved out
of their equilibrium and ownership effects intensify because
adjustments of the ownership structure occur with a certain
delay, is necessary. My results could only partially support
this conjecture and, in case of TFF ownership, rather indicate
an effect of ownership on firm performance in general, inde-
pendent from the macroeconomic condition. It cannot unan-
imously concluded that the effect for LFF ownership during
crisis observed in this study is causally linked to the economic
downturn which is why primarily qualitative research should
examine the influence of a crisis on LFF as well as the result-
ing organizational behavior.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this study was to better understand the fre-
quently assumed supremacy of TFF and LFF ownership over
other ownership types by using the GFC as a unique ex-
ogenous contingency, where firms are moved out of there
equilibrium while ownership structures stay constant at least
in the short-term and, therefore, costs and benefits of the
ownership structure are assumed to be magnified.
Introducing arguments from the agency theory, steward-
ship theory, RBV, as well as the concept of SEW, I hypothe-
sized that TFF and LFF ownership is associated with superior
performance during the GFC when compared to firms with
other ownership structures. The results of the analysis cover-
ing 178 firms listed in the German Prime Standard indicated
a general superior performance of TFF ownership over other
ownership types that was more pronounced during overall
stable economic conditions but was not observed during sit-
uations of financial distress such as the GFC. LFF ownership,
in contrast, did not exhibit superior effects during the steady-
state pre-crisis period but seemed to be beneficial in times
where firms faced serious threats due to macroeconomic de-
velopments. Furthermore, I hypothesized that the presence
of a family CEO in TFF is associated with lower firm per-
formance compared to TFF with an external CEO. However,
the results did not support this hypothesis: While beneficiary
during stable economic conditions, the competitive advan-
tage of a family CEO seemed to vanish during the GFC.
To conclude, the conjecture that ownership structures af-
fect firm performance in particular during severe economic
crises, magnifying ownership-specific costs and benefits, can-
not be supported unanimously. However, contributing to the
increasing academic discussion of family firm heterogeneity,
the results of this thesis confirm the need of a differentiated
perspective on how large the stake held by the family is (mag-
nitude of ownership), how actively the family shapes the
management of the firm (family involvement through board
membership), and whether the firm is owned and managed
by a lone founder or by descendants or multiple family mem-
bers of the founder (generational stage of family firms).
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